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Among the objections raised against Leibniz's metaphysical views,
the problem of contingency is one of the most crucial and difficult
problems Leibniz faced. The objection that Leibniz could not allow
for contingency in his metaphysical system was pressed on two fronts:
first, in connection with Leibniz's views on God; and second, in
connection with his analysis of truth. The only book written by
Leibniz that was published during his lifetime, the Theodicy
,
is
Leibniz's attempt to reconcile his views on God and contingency.
Leibniz's concern over the relation between contingency and his defi-
nition of truth can be seen in the first part of the correspondence
he initiated with Arnauld. This dissertation is an attempt to find
a solution to these problems for Leibniz.
The project, roughly speaking, is presented in three parts. The
first part, which is Ghapter I, deals with the problem of contingency
as it relates to God. I give a brief sketch of the view I later
propose for Leibniz, and then see how one can account for God within
the conceptual framework given. Various arguments for the neces-
sity of God's choice in creating this world are discussed, and three
different ways of conceiving God's role in Leibniz's metaphysical
system are considered. While I point out the difficulties with each
view, I suggest that one of them is better than the other two. In
the end I am forced to conclude that God did create this world of
Vnecessity, but argue that God's lack of freedom does not necessarily
rule contingency completely out of his system.
The second part, which consists of Chapters II and III, presents
some solutions offered by contemporary philosophers to the "analytic-
necessary" problem. This difficulty for contingency in Leibniz arises
when we reflect on Leibniz's analysis of truth. Leibniz claims that
in every true proposition the concept of the predicate is included
in the concept of the subject. This makes all true propositions
analytic, and thus necessary. G. Parkinson and N. Reseller suggest
ways of resolving this problem for Leibniz, and their views are presented
in Chapter II. Both Parkinson and Rescher believe the solution is to
be found in Leibniz's views on "infinite analysis", though each has
his own approach to the problem. I discuss as clearly as possible
their proposed solutions, but find them inadequate in various respects.
In Chapter III, I consider B. Mates' interesting new approach to the
problem. Mates presents a formal system which he believes incorporates
Leibniz's views on possible worlds, and which allows for contingency.
Much of what Mates claims seems true, and in Chapter III, I offer
support for some of his views. Yet, because certain features of Mates'
system appear non-Leibnizian, I suggest that a better account of
Leibniz can be given.
Chapters IV and V constitute the third and final part of the
project. In Chapter IV, I re-examine the "analytic-necessary" problem
in light of what has preceded and argue that in various places, espe-
cially the Theodicy and the correspondence with Arnault, Leibniz sug-
gests a way to resolve the problem, while keeping his definition of
vi
truth. I argue that Leibniz suggests we understand necessity and
contingency in terms of possible worlds and counterparts. With this
in mind I present the view more formally in Chapter V. I discuss
various formal aspects of the system presented in Chapter V and reply
to an objection raised by Mates against the use of counterparts for
Leibniz. I conclude by pointing out the relative merits of the system
I present.
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God’s role in Leibniz's metaphysical system is a main source
of difficulty for Leibniz. B. Russell has suggested that Leibniz's
views on God in conjunction with other views Leibniz holds lead him
into inconsistencies
.
1 In particular, one of the major problems is
Leibniz s account of contingency. Leibniz wants to maintain that
he can allow for contingency and that he does not fall into what has
been called 'the disease of Spinozism '. 2 In this chapter some of
the problems about God and contingency will be presented and various
ways Leibniz might be able to avoid them will be discussed.
Leibniz's picture of creation was, briefly, that God had in his
understanding an infinite number of possible worlds. Among all these
possible worlds God found the world which was the best and made it
actual. But the situation is actually more complicated, and for
better understanding of Leibniz's view of creation, let us first turn
our attention to the world as it actually is.
According to Leibniz, for each substance in the world there is
a corresponding concept, sometimes called a complete concept or a
complete individual concept.^ These concepts include or contain all
the properties that the substance to which the concept corresponds
has, had, or every will have. For our purposes, we can view concepts
as sets of properties. For example, consider Adam, the first man."*
Leibniz holds that Adam has a complete individual concept which contains
all the properties that Adam has or ever will have. If Adam has the
property of having blond hair, then the property of having blond hair
3is a member of Adam's complete individual concept. For any property
$ is a member of Adam's complete individual concept if and only if Adam
has $. Thus Adam's complete individual concept contains all and only
those properties which Adam has. This is true for every substance.
An atomic sentence is said to be true just in case the property
associated with the predicate is included in the concept associated
witn the subject. Thus, for example, the sentence, "Adam has blond
hair, is true because the concept of blond hair (i.e., the property
of having blond hair) is included in the complete individual concept
of Adam.
^
In each complete individual concept there are an infinite number
of properties. Moreover, for each substance there is exactly one
complete individual concept. Suppose Adam had two distinct concepts.
If the concepts are distinct, then they must differ with respect to
some property (say) $. Either Adam has $ or he lacks it. If Adam
has $, then the concept which does not contain $ could not be Adam's
since Adam's concept must have all his properties. If Adam lacks $,
then the concept which contains $ could not be Adam's since that concept
contains a property which Adam lacks. This is easy to see when we
consider this world only, but when we consider all possible worlds
the problem becomes more complicated.
For our present purposes it will be assumed that for Leibniz
each possible world is a special kind of set of complete individual
concepts. ^ The real world differs from the others in that in the
real world the concepts are realized (i.e., there is a substance cor-
responding to each concept) while in other worlds the concepts are
4not realized. A possible world is not just any set of concepts, but
rather a possible world is a "collection of compossibles" . ® Exactly
what Leibniz meant by "compossible" is far from clear and different
interpretations are possible. Some philosophers have viewed compos-
sibility as a relation between two things . 9 But one can also view
compossibility as a predicate of sets . 10 Since there are certain
problems involved in viewing compossibility as a relation between
two things
,
11 we will view compossibility as a property of sets. For
the moment we will say that a set of concepts is compossible just
in case all the members of the set can be realized together. 1 ^ A
possible world is a maximal compossible set of concepts.
Leibniz also believes that each concept in a world "expresses"
or "mirrors" that world. Again it is unclear what Leibniz means by
"mirrors". The idea is that concepts of the same world are related
to each other in such a way as to reflect the existence of each other.
For example, the concept of Adam contains the property of being married
to Eve. Thus in some way the concept of Adam reflects the existence
of the concept of Eve (i.e., Adam could not exist if Eve did not exist
since the concept of Adam could not be realized without the concept
of Eve being realized). In a similar way the concept of Adam reflects
all the concepts which make up this world. Thus, the definition of
mirroring would be roughly something like the following: a concept
mirrors a world just in case that concept reflects every member of
that world. A concept C reflects a concept D only if it is contra-
dictory to suppose that C is realized and D is not realized.^
5A concept can only be a member of one possible world. If a concept
C were in two distinct possible worlds, C would mirror a world W which
did not have as a member some concept D which C reflects. Since W
is a world it must be a maximal compossible set of concepts. But W
can not be a maximal compossible set of concepts, because W lacks D
as a member and C can not be realized without D. Thus all the members
of W can not be realized together, and hence W is not a possible world.
So, through the use of compossibility and mirroring we get the result
that a concept is a member of only one possible world.
Viewing possible worlds as maximal compossible sets of concepts
will help us better understand God’s role in Leibniz’s metaphysics.
According to Leibniz, God could not affect which sets of concepts were
compossible. Thus God did not create possible worlds, but rather found
them already formed in his understanding. God decided which of these
possible worlds he would realize, if any. God did not decide whether
Adam would sin, but decided whether to create Adam who would sin as
opposed to realizing other concepts.^ To return to our picture of
the creation, then, God decided among all these compossible sets of
concepts which set to realize, and God chose the best.
Leibniz's account of the creation and God's role in his meta-
physical system seems on the surface consistent, although there are
some obscurities. A closer look, however, reveals certain difficulties
for Leibniz.
Leibniz believes that God has the properties of being omnipotent,
omniscient, and omnibenevolent . But if God really is omnipotent, omnis-
cient, and omnibenevolent, could God have created any world less than
6the best of all possible worlds? If not, then some have argued there
is no contingency in Leibniz. Whether or not Leibniz could allow for
contingency, even with the supposition that God necessarily created
this world, is something which will be discussed later. We are now
interested in whether God necessarily created this world.
Leibniz does say that God created the best world of necessity, but
only in a special sense of necessity. Leibniz tries to make a dis-
tinction between two kinds of necessity. One he calls "moral necessity"
and the other "metaphysical necessity". 16 Metaphysical necessity for
Leibniz is what contemporary philosophers have called necessity or
logical necessity. Something is metaphysically necessary just in case
its negation (or opposite, as Leibniz puts it) implies a contradiction.
In this sense of necessity it is not necessary that God create this
world. However, it is morally necessary that God create the best world.
Leibniz's notion of moral necessity is not as clear as his notion of
metaphysical necessity since he never actually defines it. One can,
however, get some idea of what he meant.
Moral necessity for Leibniz is a kind of "hypothetical necessity". 1 ^
Leibniz says something is "hypothetically necessary" when it follows
from certain free decrees of God . 16 That is, if God decides a certain
thing, then the results of that decision or what follows from it are
hypothetically necessary. It is clear that Leibniz does not want to
say that Q is hypothetically necessary only if P then Q, where P is
some decree of God. This is especially true if we understand the 'if,
then' as a material conditional. Leibniz would want to say something
stronger, such as, if P entails Q, then Q is hypothetically necessary.
7We might put it by saying if it is metaphysically necessary that if P
then Q, then Q is hypothetically necessary. Since moral necessity is
a kind of hypothetical necessity, to say something is morally necessary
is to say that given a certain condition it must occur or it must be
true. The condition seems to be one of moral perfection. 19 Thus, for
example, to say that it is morally necessary that God do act a is to
say that it is metaphysically necessary that if God is morally perfect
(or acts according to moral perfection), then God does act a. Leibniz
says that while God did necessarily create this world, it is not a
necessity which destroys contingency because God’s creation was only
morally necessary and not metaphysically necessary. God could have
done otherwise, in the sense that his doing otherwise does not imply
a contradiction.
Unfortunately for Leibniz, it is not at all clear that his dis-
tinction between moral and metaphysical necessity removes the diffi-
culties about God. If our analysis of what Leibniz means by moral
necessity is correct, then from the fact that it is morally necessary
that God created this world and an assumption about the nature of God’s
properties we can conclude that it is metaphysically necessary that
God created this world (or at least the best of all possible worlds)
.
Consider the following argument:
I. (1) It is morally necessary that God create the best of
all possible worlds.
(2) It is metaphysically necessary that God is morally perfect.
/.. (3) It is metaphysically necessary that God create the best
of all possible worlds.
8Premise (1) is true according to Leibniz, 20 (2) seems true in virtue
of Cod's nature and (3) does follow from (1) and (2). We will accept
Leibniz's view that (1) is ture, although it is not clear that Leibniz
has to hold (1). However, it is not so clear that Leibniz holds (2).
In the Discourse, Leibniz says:
For it would be found that this demonstration
of this predicate as belonging to Caesar is not as
absolute as are those of numbers or of geometry,
but that this predicate supposes a sequence of things
which God has shown by his free will. This sequence
is based on the first free decree of God which was
to do always that which is the most perfect and upon
the decree which God made following the first one,
regarding human nature, which is that men should
always do, although freely, that which appears to
be the best. Now every truth which is founded upon
this kind of decree is contingent, although certain,
for the decrees of God do not change the possibilities
of things and, as I have already said, although God
assuredly chooses the best, this does not prevent
that which is less perfect from being possible in
itself. (OC p. 22)
If we take Leibniz literally when he says that God's first free decree
was always to act in the most perfect way, then we can see why Leibniz
would deny (2). Since Leibniz says that everything based on that decree
is contingent, then God's acting in the most perfect way is contingent,
and thus it is not metaphysically necessary that God is morally perfect.
God's being morally perfect is based on his own free decree to be
morally perfect. Thus, the argument is unsound and Leibniz is saved
from God's being metaphysically necessitated to create the best of all
possible worlds. But the problem for Leibniz is not so easily solved.
In the first place, in order for Leibniz to hold the position
suggested above he must give up a traditional view about God, namely,
that Cod by definition is morally perfect as well as omnipotent and
9omniscient. Traditionally, God has those attributes by definition.
But if God is morally perfect because of a free decree he made, then
in a metaphysical sense God could have been less than morally perfect.
Of course, pointing out that Leibniz's views on God are not in accord
with traditional views on God is not a criticism of his view. But
it is strange that Leibniz would allow that it is possible that God
is not morally perfect. A more important problem for Leibniz is that
of reconciling his above account of God's moral perfection with his
view of truth.
As mentioned earlier, Leibniz said that a sentence is true just
in case the concept of the predicate is included in the concept of
the subject. (For the purposes of this discussion, we will ignore
some difficulties of this account of truth by assuming all sentences
can be put into subject-predicate form.) In those cases where the
referent of the subject of a sentence is a human or any other finite
substance, we can see how Leibniz's account works. But what about God?
That is, what about sentences in which the referent of the subject
is God? Are those sentences to be handled in the same way as sentences
in which the referent of the subject is a finite substance? There
are two strong reasons for believing the answer to be yes. In the
first place, Leibniz never makes an exception to his definition of
truth, and it is hard to believe that he would make God one. In the
second place, Leibniz says that corresponding to every substance there
is a complete individual concept and there is no reason to believe
that Leibniz thought God was an exception, even though God is an infinite
substance. If God has a concept, - then there seems to be no reason not
10
to claim that sentences about God are true just in case the concept
of the predicate is included in the concept of God. However, if we
say this then it seems, as opposed to what Leibniz says, that (2)
is true.
If we consider the sentence, "God is morally perfect," as true,
then the concept of moral perfection is included in the concept of
God. But if the concept of moral perfection is included in the concept
of God, then does it not follow that it is metaphysically necessary
that God is morally perfect? To determine whether or not this follows,
we must briefly consider what Leibniz says about metaphysical necessity.
As mentioned earlier, Leibniz explicitly says that something is
metaphysically necessary just in case its negation implies a contra-
diction. However, there are certain problems if we understand Leibniz
as saying this simpliciter
. The suggestion being presented is that
P is necessary if and only if not-P entails a contradiction. But on
this view we can show that it is necessary that Adam has blond hair,
clearly an unwanted result. The proof of this is something like the
following:
(1) For any x, and for any set S, if x e S, then necessarily
x e S
.
(2) If the concept of blond hair e the concept of Adam, then
necessarily the concept of blond hair e the concept of
Adam.
(3) Necessarily the concept of blond hair e the concept of
Adam.
Assume: (A) It is not the case that Adam has blond hair.
11
.les
(5) It is not the case that the concept of blond hair
e the concept of Adam.
(6) The concept of blond hair e the concept of Adam.
/.. (7) Q and not-Q.
(3) It is not the case that Adam has blond hair implj
Q and not-Q.
(9) It is not the case that Adam has blond hair entails
Q and not-Q.
/.. (10) Necessarily Adam has blond hair.
(1) is a truth about sets, and (2) is just an instantiation of (1).
Assuming that Adam does have blond hair and given Leibniz's definition
of truth, from (2) we can get (3). We then assume Adam does not have
blond hair, and using Leibniz's definition we arrive at a contradiction.
Given that (3) is a necessary statement, and (8) followed from only
our assumption and necessary truths, we can conclude (9). From the
definition of necessity suggested and (9) we finally conclude (10).
It is obvious that something has gone wrong here. Leibniz clearly
wants Adam to have blond hair contingently.
The answer to this problem lies in the narrow view suggested
above of Leibniz's notion of metaphysical necessity. While it is
true that in some sense Adam can not lack the property of having
blond hair, namely in the sense described above, it should not follow
that it is metaphysically necessary that Adam has blond hair. Leibniz's
notion of metaphysical necessity involves in part Leibniz's use of
possible worlds. We want to say that a proposition is metaphysically
necessary just in case it is true in all worlds,, not just the world
12
that exists. Setting up such an account for Leibniz is something which
will be discussed at great length later, as well as opposing points
of view on this quention. A complete account of Leibniz's notion of
metaphysical necessity is not necessary to discuss the problems about
God in Leibniz's metaphysical system. For different accounts presented
and discussed in detail, see Chapters II, III, and IV. In Chapter IV
it is suggested that for Leibniz to say a sentence of the form ’x is
F' is necessary is to say that all the "counterparts" of the concept
of x include the concept of F. A "counterpart" of a concept is a con-
cept which contains certain properties which the original concept
contains. Intuitively, if the two concepts were realized, then the
two substances would be very similar to each other. For example, to
say of a sentence about Adam that it is metaphysically necessary is
to say that all the counterparts of the concept of Adam in various
worlds include the concept of the predicate. This will hold true for
all finite substances. But a difficulty emerges when we try to account
for God in this conceptual framework.
It makes some sense to talk about the counterparts of the concept
of Adam being in various worlds, as we can talk about the concept of
Adam being a member of this world. But in God's case it is not so
clear that his concept is a member of any world. Talk about counter-
part concepts of the concept of God seems, on the face of it, bizarre.
There are, as far as we can tell, three plausible ways of considering
God in the conceptual framework just set up, but all have difficulties.
We could say that the concept of God is not a member of any world,
but somehow exists apart from all worlds (call this view A). We can
13
still say that an atomic sentence about God is true just in case the
concept of the subject includes the concept of the predicate. However,
we can no longer say, as we did in the case of Adam, that a sentence
about God is necessarily true just in case all the counterparts of the
concept of God in various possible worlds include the concept of the
predicate, since it makes no sense to talk about the counterparts of
the concept of God, nor does it make sense to talk about God's concept
being a member of a possible world. We might say that God is an
exception and the truth conditions for necessary sentences about God
are somehow different from those about (say) Adam. But it is not clear
which sentences are to count as being about God. Clearly all atomic
sentences in which the concept of the subject is the concept of God
will be counted as being about God, but what about such sentences as,
"There is an all-knowing being," or, "There exists a necessary being"?
Even if we could somehow find a way to distinguish sentences about God
from sentences not about God, we would still need to decide what the
truth conditions for necessary sentences would be. And without the
use of possible worlds it is far from clear what they would be.
A second view, (B)
,
and an alternative approach to the suggestion
that God's concept is not a member of any world, would be the view
that God's concept is a member of every world. Atomic and necessary
sentences about God would be treated the same as sentences about Adam.
We would thus have a uniform account of truth for all sentences in
the language. Consider, for example, the sentence, "God is all-powerful".
This sentence will be necessary just in case all the counterparts of
the concept of God in various worlds have the property of being all-
14
powerful. In God's case the counterparts of the concept of God will
simply be the concept of God. But this also has its difficulties.
If you will recall, a possible world is a maximal compossible set
of concepts. Moreover, each concept mirrors the world of which it
is a member. As argued earlier
,
21
no concept can be a member of two
worlds, yet on this view we are supposing that God's concept is a
member of every world. This is clearly an inconsistency.
The only way we can see to avoid this inconsistency, given the
view described above, is to claim that in some way God is an exception.
We might wish to claim that there is a basis for making God an exception,
namely God is an infinite substance, whereas we mere mortals are only
finite substances. The idea would be that the compossibility and
mirroring relations are only applicable to finite substance concepts
(i.e., concepts such that if actualized, the corresponding substance
would be finite) and not to infinite substance concepts (of which
there is only one) . If we accept this finite-infinite substance concept
distinction, then the view does not appear to be inconsistent. However,
while not inconsistent, it has some obvious bad results for Leibniz.
For example, it turns out that all of God's properties are possessed
by him of necessity. Consider any property P that God possesses. Since
God has P, P is a member of the concept of God. The concept of God
is a member of every world, thus God has P of necessity. In particular,
it is metaphysically necessary that God is morally perfect. But this
result is exactly the result which started our discussion of Leibniz's
view of metaphysical necessity, and which we had hoped to avoid.
15
A third approach
does in fact have dis
worlds, as does Adam.
,
(C)
,
to the problem would be to say that God
tinct counterpart concepts in various possible
22 On this view we suppose that God has certain
essential properties (e.g., being all-knowing), but also God has
contingent properties which are in some of his counterparts, but
not all. We could then say that being morally perfect is a contingent
property of God s. We can also hold the Leibnizian view that God
exists necessarily. This would be true because the concept of God
would have a counterpart in every world. This view avoids a number
of problems that the second view must account for. For example, in
the second view we had to make God an exception to the principle that
a concept is in only one world. But with the view now being suggested,
God is not an exception, because the concept of God is only a member
of one world, namely this one. The relations of compossibility and
mirroring will apply to the concept of God and to the counterparts
of the concept of God. This view has the major advantage of being
uniform in that God is treated on a par with Adam, or with any other
substance. However, this view is not without its problems.
One major difficulty with view C is that it is non-Leibnizian.
Leibniz says that possible worlds are found in God's understanding,
which is the region of possibles, and that from among them God chose
one to create. On this view there seems to be no way of explaining
how God, whose concept is a member of only one world, viewed all the
possible worlds and picked one to create. The picture of creation
that Leibniz presents is that of God standing apart from the possible
worlds and viewing them to see which is the best to create. View A
16
seems closest to the text in this respect, view C seems farthest from
it, and B somewhere between A and C. The idea that the concept of
God has distinct counterparts in every possible world is totally alien
to Lerbniz, and it seems clear he would reject it. Thus, while view
C is an interesting one and it solves a number of difficulties, it is
too un-Leibnizian to be acceptable.
The most promising of the three views presented seems to be view
B, but if we opt for view B then, at the very least, we are left to
deal with the conclusion of argument I, namely, it is metaphysically
necessary that God create the best of all possible worlds, much to
Leibniz's chagrin. However, this result is not as bad as one might
think. Before we pursue this, let us return to the original argument
for a closer look.
It does seem curious that Leibniz affirms premise (1) in the argu-
ment as opposed to affirming something like:
(4) It is morally necessary that if God decides to create
some world, then God will create the best of all possible
worlds
.
If we understand moral necessity as suggested, then (4) translates into
the followiug in terms of metaphysical necessity:
(5) It is metaphysically necessary that if God decides to
create some world, then God will create the best of all
possible worlds.
In order to logically conclude (3), we would need an additional premise,
namely
:
17(7)
It is morally necessary that God decide to create some
possible world. ^3
The reason that Leibniz so willingly affirms premise (1) as opposed
to something like (4) is that he holds (7), or something like it, to
be true. Leibniz says:
. . . it may be said that God can cause virtue to be
in the world without any mixture of vice, and even
that he can do so easily
. But, since he has permitted
vice, it must be that that order of the universe which
was found preferable to every other plan required it.
One must believe that it is not permitted to do other-
wise, since it is not possible to do better. (T p. 197)
Leibniz seems to believe that if God did not create any world at all
r\ /
then God would not be doing what was best. The best possible series
of events that could occur would be for God to do exactly as he did.
Thus (7) is true. It therefore makes no difference whether Leibniz
affirms (1) or (4), since in either case we can conclude (3). But
is (3) really that bad for Leibniz?
One might want to distinguish between (3) and something like:
(8) It is metaphysically necessary that God create the
actual world;
and
,
(9) It is metaphysically necessary that God create this
world
.
One might want to claim (9) is a bad result, but (3) is not since this
world is not necessarily the best of all possible worlds. But for
Leibniz (3), (8) and (9) all say the same thing. It is necessary
that this world is the best of all possible worlds, hence (3) and (9)
say the same thing. The phrase "the actual world" is just another
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name for this world, thus (8) and (9), and hence (3) say the same thing.
Leibniz would reject (3), (8) and (9) for reasons similar to those given
for his rejection of (2). But if we adopt the second view of meta-
physical necessity suggested, then it seems Leibniz is stuck with (9).
God did create this world, thus included in his concept is the property
of creating this world. Hence, it is metaphysically necessary that
God create this world. As noted before, any property that God has, he
has of necessity.
It appears that for Leibniz we have reached the end of the rope.
It is metaphysically necessary that God create this world, thus God
had no choice but to create this world. This conclusion is bad in
itself for Leibniz, but what seems worse is that everything which
follows from God's creation is also necessary. What this seems to
mean is that all true sentences about this world are necessarily true,
and hence Leibniz cannot allow for contingency as his objectors have
maintained. But while it is true that God does nothing but of neces-
sity, it is not so clear that we mortals are under the same constraint.
It is not at all clear that it follows from God's creating this
world of necessity that (say) it is necessary that Adam has blond
hair. (Necessity will be used in the metaphysical sense henceforth.)
On the view suggested above, to say that it is necessary that Adam
has blond hair is to say that all of the counterparts of the concept
of Adam in various possible worlds include the concept of blond hair.
Surely this will still be false, and hence it is contingent that
Adam has blond hair.
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One might think that since God created this world of necessity,
this world is the only possible world, other "worlds" being impossible.
If this world is the only possible world, then the concept of Adam
has a single counterpart in the various possible worlds, namely itself.
Thus, it is true that all of the counterparts of the concept of Adam
include the concept of blond hair (since there is only one counterpart),
and hence it is necessary that Adam has blond hair. This argument
presupposes a certain view about what possible worlds are. It assumes
that a world is a possible world just in case the world could have
been actualized. And this is indeed the way we have been considering
possible worlds. But this is not the only way to view possible worlds.
Leibniz says, "although God assuredly chooses the best, this does not
prevent that which is less perfect from being possible in itself,"
(OC p. 22). The notion that is important here is that of something
"being possible in itself". We can view possible worlds not as worlds
which God might create, but rather as worlds which are not contra-
dictory. In order to see how this might work we will have to revise
our definition of compossibility
.
Let P be the set of all properties P . . .P
,
and C the set of
1 n
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all complete individual concepts C . ,.C . Let us further suppose
1 n
we have a first-order language such as the lower predicate calculus.
In our language we have a number of predicates F ...F (let F be the
1 n
set of all predicates) and constants a,...
a
(let A be the set of allIn
constants). Let f be a function from F onto P, and from A onto C,
so that for each F in F, f(F )=P for some i, and for each a in A
i l i 1
f (a
.
)=C for some i. Let H be the set of all the sentences of our
i i
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language of the form Ox where 0 is a member of F and x is a member
of A. We can now define a function g from C into the power set of
the Cartesian product of F and A. For each C. in C, g(C ) is the set1 i
of ordered pairs (x, y) such that x is a member of F and y is a member
of A and f(y)=C i and f(x)=P i for each P ± in C i> We can now define
a function h from g(C ) into H. h(g(C )) is a set S of sentences1 i
of the form Ox and F^a is a member of S if and only if the ordered
pair (F
±
,
a ) is a member of gCCj. A set of complete individual
concepts C^, is compossible if and only if hCgCC^)) union
h (g (C^) )••• union MgCC^))... is consistent. A set of sentences is
consistent if and only if it is not the case they mutually entail
every sentence. A possible world is a maximal compossible set of
concepts. Possible worlds are possible in the sense that they are
somehow internally compatible, and not according to whether God could
or could not have created them. While it may be impossible that God
create any world other than this world, that does not make the worlds
themselves impossible. However, it appears that even if we make the
distinction between two views of possibility we are still left with
the original objection.
On view B God has all of his properties of necessity. In parti-
cular, God has the property of being self-identical and Adam existing
of necessity. But if God has that property, then it would seem to
follow that Adam exists of necessity. Since this seems true of every
substance for all the properties it has, there appears to be no con-
tingency. But a closer examination of this argument will reveal that
on the view being suggested it is unsound. Let ’a' represent 'Adam',
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g represent ’God', and represent ’it is necessary that’,
can symbolize the property in question with the use of abstracts
The argument can be represented as follows:
We
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II* (1) St [ x-x „ (Ey) (a=y)] g
(2) [it [ x=x - (Ey) (a=y) J g + (Ey)(a=y)]
/ • • (3) p (Ey) (a=y)
.
The argument is clearly valid, and sound on some interpretations of
and
. But on the view being suggested premise (2) is false.
The key to understanding premise (2) is realizing that ’£[x=x A (Ey)
(a=y)] names a property just as ’F' names a property. A modal operator
in front of an abstract does not alter the name of the property. Thus
the following sentence can be true:
(4)0 [St [x=x A (Ey)(a=y)] g A v(Ey) (a=y))
Consider a world W where the concept of Adam lacks a counterpart. In
that world it will be true that the concept of God contains the property
of being self-identical and Adam existing, and it will be true that
the concept of Adam lacks a counterpart. This is the interpretation
of (4). If (4) is true, then it is clear that (2) must be false. The
point can be put in a different way.
While it is true that £ [x=x A (Ey)(a=y)]g is equivalent to g=g A
(Ey)(a~y), they are not necessarily equivalent. The reason they are
not necessarily equivalent is in the nature of modal operators on this
view. When a modal operator preceeds a sentence which contains a
constant not included in the name of a predicate, then the sentence
is understood as saying something about the counterparts of the concept
associated with the constant. However, when the constant occurs in
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the name of a predicate in a sentence, then adding modal operators to
the sentence does not affect the name of the predicate. Thus, *[x=x ,
(Ey) (a=y)J g says something different from (g=g A (Ey)(a=y)). Admittedly,
it seems strange, even contradictory, to say that in some world God
has the property of being self-identical and Adam existing, yet Adam
does not exist in that world. One might ask himself, how can it be
that God have that property and Adam not exist? The answer is that
God could not have that property unless Adam existed, but it is not
necessary that Adam exist in every world in order that God have the
property in every world. In effect, the property that God has in every
world is that of being self-identical and Adam existing in some world.
In view of these considerations it seems that for all the problems
that view B has, it can allow for contingency.
The fact that God created this world of necessity does create
some minor problems for the view being suggested. Intuitively, counter-
parts of concepts are those concepts God might have realized in place
of the concepts he did realize. But if God created this world of
necessity, then we can not literally view counterparts this way since
God could not have realized any concepts other than the ones he in
fact realized. But I do not believe this to be a major difficulty.
The problem of what counterparts are is discussed in detail in Chapter V.
To summarize the position being suggested, an atomic sentence Fa
is true if and only if the concept of F is included in the concept of
a_. An atomic sentence Fa is necessary just in case all the counter-
parts of the concept of a. include the concept of F. The concept of
God is different than any other concept and it is not subject to the
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same restrictions that other concepts have. This is in part because
the concept of God is the concept of an infinite substance. The con-
cept of God is a member of every world and hence has every property
necessarily, including the property of creating this world. But even
though God necessarily created this world, it does not follow that
all true propositions are necessary. Adam has blond hair contingently
because some of the counterparts of the concept of Adam do not include
the property of having blond hair.
Leibniz believed that he could avoid the consequence that God
necessarily created this world, and his writings reflect his belief.
In order to facilitate discussions in the remainder of this dissertation
it will be assumed for the most part that God was free in his creation.
Since God’s necessarily creating this world does not affect the con-
tingency of other sentences, the assumption will not cause any major
difficulties. If this becomes important, it will certainly be noted.
As pointed out in the introduction, there are two kinds of objections
raised against Leibniz to the effect that he cannot allow for contingency.
One deals with the problem of God and has been accounted for in this
chapter. The other is what we will call the "analytic-necessary" problem.
In the next chapter, two solutions offered for this problem by two dif-
ferent philosophers will be discussed. It will be assumed in that
chapter that God is free in his creation of this world.
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NOTES FOR CHAPTER I
1* R PP- 38-39.
2.
R p. 39.
3. T p. 151.
4. OC pp. 13, 19. Also see p. 55 (this paper).
5. I am assuming that Adam existed.
6. In order to avoid confusion I introduce a standard use for "concent"terminology which will be continued throughout the rest of this paperA proposition is the bearer of truth and is expressed by a sentence.When I say a sentence is true I mean the proposition expressed bythe^sentence is true. The terms "subject" and "predicate" refer toparts of sentences. The phrase "the concept of the subject" will
refer to the concept associated with the subject of a sentence. Thephrase the concept of the predicate" will refer to the concept as-
sociated with the predicate of a sentence, which is a property. "The
concept of the subject of a proposition" is to be understood as the
concept of the subject of a sentence which expresses the proposition.
The concept of a term is the concept associated with the term.
7. I discuss this point in more detail on pp. 57-58.
8.
R p. 223.
9.
Both Russell and Mates view compossibility this way. See R p. 66,
and Ml pp. 511-514. Later Mates' view is discussed in more detail;
see pp. 58-62.
10. This is the view I later argue for. See pp. 100-104.
11. See pp. 58-62.
12. Because of certain problems raised later in this chapter, the
definition of compossibility will have to be revised.
13. OC p. 109.
14. For a precise, complete account of "compossibility", "mirroring",
and "possible world" see pp. 100-104 and the appendix.
15. L p. 414.
16. T pp. 203, 229, 270, 271.
17. T pp. 187, 197, 252.
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18. OC pp.. 20, 21.
19. T pp. 187, 387. OC
20. T pp. 187, 197, 271.
21. See p. 5.
22. This view was suggested to me by Fred A. Feldman.
23. Robert C. Sleigh Jr. pointed out to me that this is the weakest
premise possible in order to conclude (3) from (5) and (2).
24. See also T pp. 377, 378, 386, 429.
25. The language being imagined is the following (ALPC):
I. Logical symbols, ’a.'
, ,
’v’
,
’(',
* ) * , \\ ' = * } 1 ['
,
J > .
II. Non-logical symbols, terms:
(i) Constants a j ... a
(ii) Variables xj ... x
Predicate letters: f}, ..? F 1
,
F 2 ... F 2 .... Fn ... F
n
1 n 1 n 1 n
’
III. Definition of wff: $ is a wff if and only if
(i) $ is an n-place predicate followed by n terms, or
(ii) If $ is a wff then M> is a wff, and
(iii) If $ and
^
are wffs then $ v is a wff, and
(iv) If $ and ij; are wffs then
<J> A is a wff
(v) If $ and are wffs then $ E \p is a wff
(vi) If $ is a wff then (x)$ is a wff
(vii) If $ is a wff then (Ex)$ is a wff
$ is an n-place predicate iff either
(i) $ is an n-place predicate letter, or
(ii) If $ is a wff containing n free variables x
^
...
then ... & [$ ] is an n-place predicate (where
’free' is defined in the usual way.
The rules for ALPC are the same as LPC with the following addition:
(1) Xj ... x [$| aj ... a = $
a l/xj ... an/x (where tjja/8 is
read"a replaces all occurrences of 6 in $").
Example sentence: "Adam is married to Eve" will be translated as
the following: it [xMe]a, where 'xMy' is 'x is married to y' and *e'
is 'Eve', and 'a' is 'Adam'. k[xMe]a is understood as expressing
the proposition that Adam has the property of being married to Eve.
26. See note 25 above.
CHAPTER II
N
Some philosophers argue that Leibniz cannot allow for contingency
not because of God's lack of freedom, but because of Leibniz's defini-
tion of truth. John W. Nason presents a now-familiar criticism of
Leibniz based on Leibniz's view of truth. Nason says of Leibniz:
... he asserts that all true affirmative propositions
are analytic, i.e., they are true because the subject
includes the predicate. This is as true, he asserts,
of contingent propositions as it is of necessary truths.
But if it were true that all true affirmative proposi-
tions are analytic, then all such propositions are
necessary and there is no contingency. If some pro-
positions are genuinely contingent, they can not be
analytic. . .
In this chapter, the views of two contemporary philosophers, G.H.R.
Parkinson and N. Rescher, will be considered. Both suggest a way of
understanding Leibniz in which Leibniz can avoid the objection Nason
and others have raised against him. We will call this objection the
"analytic-necessary" problem since the criticism is, in effect, that
since Leibniz holds that all true propositions are analytic, it follows
that all true propositions are necessary. Parkinson and Rescher offer
different solutions to the problem, and it shall be argued here that
each solution is in some way inadequate.
G.H.R. Parkinson presents what he believes is Leibniz's solution
to the analytic-necessary problem in his book Logic and Reality in
Leibniz s Metaphysics . Parkinson says:
By making use of the notion of an infinite analysis
of certain concepts, Leibniz has succeeded in recon-
ciling his view that every truth is either an expressly
or implicitly identical proposition with his view that
not all truths are necessary. (Pi P» 73)
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He reconciles the two views by saying that to speak
of necessary and contingent truths is to speak of
our ability or inability to prove that a true propo-
sition is identical. Briefly, every truth is anidentical proposition, or reducible to one; a truth
is necessary if it is either an identical proposition,
or human beings can demonstrate that it is an identical
proposition; it is contingent if they cannot but know
its truth by other non-deductive means. (PI pp. 71-72)
All truths, in his (Leibniz's) view, are either identical
propositions or reducible to them; but those which are
either identical propositions or reducible to such prop-
ositions in a finite number of operations we call ’neces-
sary
,
and those which require an inf initenumber of
operations for their reduction we call 'contingent'.
(PI p. 73)
In order to understand the view that Parkinson is trying to present, one
should first try to understand some of the expressions Parkinson uses
in presenting the view.
Parkinson holds that Leibniz gives two accounts of truth, one in
terms of inclusion of the concept of the predicate in the concept of
the subject, and the other in terms of what he calls 'identical propo-
sitions'. On the first account, to say a proposition is true is to
say that the concept of the subject includes or contains the concept
of the predicate. The second account is that a proposition is true
just in case either it is an identical proposition or it is reducible
to an identical proposition. Parkinson points out that for Leibniz
an identical proposition is not just a proposition expressed by an
identity sentence.
He (Leibniz) makes it clear, however, that when he
speaks of an identical proposition in the present
context he has in mind, not only propositions such
as 'A man is a man'
,
but also propositions such
as 'A white man is white' . In effect, he is using
the term' identical ' as a synonym for ' tautologous '
,
as he himself implies when he remarks that he ca.11s
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certain truths 'identical' because 'it seems that
they do nothing but repeat the same thing, without
teaching us anything'
. In saying, then, that a
true proposition is either an identical proposition
or reducible to one, Leibniz means that a true
proposition either is or is reducible to a tautology.
(PI p. 65)
Parkinson writes inaccurately when he applies the word 'tautology' to
a sentence like, "A white man is white". This sentence is not a taut-
ology? as the word is generally used, however it is a logical truth.
We should understand Parkinson here to mean by tautology what is
ordinarily meant by logical truth. Thus an identical proposition
is a proposition expressed by a logical truth.
Parkinson says that Leibniz relates these two accounts of truth,
"by saying that in an identical proposition the predicate is in the
subject manifestly or expressly, whilst in all other true propositions
it is present in the subject in a concealed form ( tecte ) , or implicitly
or virtually," (PI p. 57). Parkinson is claiming, in effect, that
the two accounts of truth Leibniz presents are the same. To say that
a proposition is true if it is an identical proposition is the same as
saying that a proposition is true if the concept of the predicate is
included in the concept of the subject expressly. Similarly, to say
that a non-identical proposition can be reduced to an identical propo-
sition is the same as saying the concept of the predicate is included
in the concept of the subject, but only implicitly cr virtually. Given
that these two accounts of truth are the same, we are still left to
puzzle over how a non-identical proposition is reduced to an identical
proposition.
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Parkinson tries to explain away our puzzlement by means of an
example. He asks us to consider the non- identical proposition expressed
by the sentence, "Every man is rational". Since the sentence is non-
identical, the inclusion of the concept of the predicate in the concept
of the subject is only implicit. Parkinson continues and says, "This
inclusion can, as he (Leibniz) remarks, be made explicit by analysis
of the concepts or terms of the proposition; in this case, by replacing
the term 'man' by the term 'rational animal', giving the proposition.
Every rational animal is rational,' which Leibniz would call an
identical proposition," (PI p. 58). There is a minor difficulty here.
This example can create more problems than it should if one believes
that the proposition expressed by, "Every man is rational," is identical
to the proposition expressed by, "Every rational animal is rational".
In order to avoid problems which are not really relevant to the problem
at hand, we assume the sentences express different propositions. But
even if we ignore the problem of propositional identity, it seems we
have removed the problem only one step further. In order to explain
how a non-identical proposition can be reduced to an identical propo-
sition, Parkinson introduces the notion of an "analysis of the concepts
or terms of the proposition". It is not that the notion is non-Leibnizian,
for Leibniz often talks about performing an analysis of a concept, but
it seems just as opaque as the idea of a reduction. Parkinson, however,
attempts to clarify it.
He says, "a proposition is 'reduced' by means of the analysis of
concepts, i.e. by substitutions made on the basis of definitions. This
analysis of concepts, it may be remembered, is analogous to spelling
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out the letters of a word," (PI p . 74). But this explanation by
Parkinson does not see™ to be much help. Consider the example Parkinson
gives, where we start with the proposition that every man is rational
and by an analysis of eoncepts end with the proposition that every
rational animal is rational. According to Parkinson the analysis in
this case is the replacement of the term 'man' by the term 'rational
animal'. It is clear that one can not replace the term 'man' in the
proposition that every man is rational, since the term does not occur
m the Proposition. What Parkinson might mean is that if we replace
the term ’man’ in the sentence "Every man is rational" by the term
rational animal’, the resulting sentence is, "Every rational animal
is rational". But while this makes some sense, it hardly seems like
performing an analysis on a concept. However, it does indicate how we
might reduce one proposition to another proposition. We can say that
the proposition that every man is rational can be reduced to the propos-
ition that every rational animal is rational, if the sentence "Every man
is rational", which expresses the proposition that every man is rational,
is such that when we replace the term ’man’ by the term 'rational animal'
the resulting sentence expresses the proposition that every rational
animal is rational and the concept associated with the term 'man' is
identical to the concept associated with the term 'rational animal'.
But the problem suggested above be ignored because it seemed irrelevant
seems very relevant now. If the concept of man is identical to the
concept of rational animal, then it would seem that the proposition
that every man is rational is identical with the proposition that every
rational animal is rational. And if we are only discussing one proposition,
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what sense can be made of the claim that a reduction has occurred?
One way to avoid this problem is to understand the reduction as
occurring in the language with which we express the propositions. That
is, we understand the notion of a reduction of propositions which allows
that if we reduce a proposition to a proposition, the propositions need
not be distinct. For example, suppose that the proposition that every
man is rational is identical to the proposition that every rational
animal is rational. We can still say that the proposition expressed
by the sentence Every man is rational" is reduced to the proposition
expressed by the sentence "Every rational animal is rational", because
the sentence "Every rational animal is rational" can be obtained from
the sentence "Every man is rational" by replacement of terms whose
concepts are identical. Thus, what we define is a notion of reduci-
bility relative to propositions and sentences. When we talk about
propositions being reduced, we mean propositions expressed by certain
sentences
.
One might object that on this view the relation of reducibility
is symmetrical. But for our pusposes, it does not matter if the rela-
tion is symmetrical. It is unimportant that it follows that if one can
reduce a non-logical truth to a logical truth, then one can reduce a
logical truth to a non-logical truth. We are primarily interested in
the first step, that is, how one can reduce non-logical truths to
logical truths. This view seems to explain this. We can generalize
this view in a definition. First, some notation: if $ is a sentence,
then let P($) be the proposition $ expresses, if any.
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(DFR) P($) can be reduced to P(*) iff $ contains a term a, and
ip is exactly like 3> except that for each occurrence of a
m ip contains a term 3, and the concept of a is identical
to the concept of 3.
The idea of an analysis is relevant in the sense that in some way
one has to analyze the concept of a and the concept of 3 in order to
determine whether they are identical or not. One analyzes the concept
of a by, as it were, spelling out the properties contained in the
concept. Parkinson suggests it is, "analogous to spelling our the
letters of a word". Perhaps (DFR) is not much help in understanding
what an analysis of a concept is, but it does give us an idea of what
a reduction is, which is what we wanted in the first, place. Thus we
can say with some clarity that a proposition is true just in case it
is an identical proposition or it is reducible to one. We now turn
to the problem of necessary propositions.
Parkinson seems to present two different accounts of necessity
for Leibniz. According to one, a proposition is necessary just in
case either it is an identical proposition or human beings can demon-
strate that it is an identical proposition. On the other, a propos-
ition is necessary if and only if either it is an identical proposition
or is reducible to an identical proposition in a finite number of oper-
ations. However, even though these two accounts appear to be different,
they are essentially the same. In the first account Parkinson wants
to understand the word ’can' in the phrase ’human being can demonstrate’
in a strict logical sense. Thus, according to Parkinson, any propos-
ition that is reducible to an identical proposition in a finite number
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of operations is one such that humans 'can' demonstrate that it is
an identical proposition. Therefore, the two accounts are really
equivalent. A necessary proposition is either an identical propo-
sition or one reducible to an identical proposition in a finite number
of operations. A contingent proposition is one that is not an iden-
tical proposition and its reduction to an identical proposition would
require an infinite number of operations. But unfortunately it appears
that under (DFR) all reductions are finite; all require a single
operation. If this is the case, then all true propositions are necessary
There are at least two possible ways of attempting to meet this diffi-
culty. One way is to change the definition of reduction to allow in
some way the notion of an infinite number of operations. The other
way is to attempt a more precise definition of a concept and see if
the idea of an infinite number of operations arises there. The latter
way appears to involve us in a number of obscurities, thus we will try
the former method first. First, some notation to make the definitions
more readable. If \p is obtained from $ by replacing all occurrences
of a in $ by 3, then S(^)={3).
(DFR1) P($) can be reduced to P (ip ) in a finite number of operations
if there is a series of sentences $ 0 , ... such that
$q=$ and and for each i, 1 <_ i <_ n, is obtained
from by replacing a term a in by a term 3 not a member
of S($.), and the concept of a is identical to the
JO. 3
concept of 3*
P($) can be reduced to P(^) in an infinite number of operations
if there is a series of sentences $ ... $
n
...
such that
(DFR2)
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t - t
0 , and for any i, 1 < 1, *.
+i
is obtained from * by
replacing a term a in * by a term 6 not a member of (J s(4> )
J£i j
*
and the concept of a is identical to the concept of 3, and ^
is the limit of the series $ ... $
0 n
To say that ip is the limit of the series is to say that for each $
i
which is a member of the series, 4> is closer to * than * is, and no
member of the series is identical to ip
.
The idea is that just as 1 is
the limit of the series 1/2, 1/2 + 1/4, 1/2 + 1/4 + 1/8, ..., $ is the
limit of the series
... ... The analogy between 1 and ip is a
good one in the sense that Leibniz himself often gives similar kinds
of examples in attempting to explain the notion of an infinite analysis.
But it is not clear just how analogous the two cases are. It makes
sense to talk about 1 being the limit of the series 1/2, 1/2 + 1/4, ...,
the notion in this case is well defined. But in the case of the
series
... it is not clear that there is a limit. To inves-
O
tigate this problem, several definitions are needed. Let {S } be a
n
sequence with n members. Let {S } be a sequence with n members. For
n
example if n equals 5, then {S^} stands for the sequence <3^ S 2 , S 3 ,
S
4 ’
S
5
> where the subscripts stand for the identity of members and 'S’
stands for the kind of objects in the sequence. In the example given
* S
x
T
may be '1/2’, and 'S
2
' may be *1/2 + 1/4', and so on. Let '>'
represent the ordering relation of the sequence in question. might
mean 'is greater than or equal to' and in our example we could say
,
S
1 >_
S
2
*. An a) sequence is a sequence whose cardinality is equal
to that of m.
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DF1. ( S^) is an increasing w sequence if and only if (n ) (S > S )
An increasing w sequence {S^}is bounded above if and only if
(ES) [(n) S
n
< S]
We define the notion of a limit for a bounded increasing w sequence:
DF3: lim {S
n
> n e a, = df ( lX )(n) [S^ < x . (y)(S < y ^ x < y)]
Let {$
n
> represent the appropriate sequence. It is not clear that
('V haS 3 llmit - In the first place, it is not clear that {$ } is
n
an a) sequence.
Before we can even start we must assume that the language has at
least an infinite number of terms. But even if we assume that the set
of terms is infinite, we are still not guaranteed that the sequence
is infinite. We need a further condition. To avoid needless complexity,
suppose $ only contains one term which can be replaced. Let R($ )U
0
represent the replacement set for $ (i.e., the set of all those terms
0
which can replace the term in $ ) . In order to guarantee that {$ } is
0 n
infinite, the following condition must hold: (E) : (n) [r($ ) s($ )] .
n r <n r
J
This condition, in effect, guarantees for us (if it holds) that the
replacement set for 1 (for any n) has not already been exhausted or
n
used up by the time we reach $ in the series. If (E) holds, then{$ }
n n
will be infinite. But a sequence's being infinite is not sufficient
for it to have a limit. For one thing, the sequence must be bounded.
Is it true that all the members of {$ } are less than \p? In this con-
n
text it does not, of course, make any sense to talk about one sentence
being less than another sentence. The proposition expressed by ip is
supposed to be an identical proposition, while the members of the sequence
do not express logical truths. As we. progress along the sequence they
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become closer and closer to i|>. In order to find out whether really
is the limit, we need some definition of the closeness relation.
Consider the sequence $
,
$ ... $ ... $ , 1 ,01 i j
DM: i. is closer to * than $. if and only if: (i) There exlsts
a sequence such that is before $ and is the limit;
and (ii) For all sequences {$"} such that $ = then
n i o’
if * is not in {$'}, then the limit is not ijj.
This definition in effect says that if $
.
is closer to than $ is,
J i
then the only way to approach \p from is through DF4 gives us
a precise definition of the relation of closeness, but it also leads
one to a question which seems to be the crux of the whole problem.
That is, are the rules given for replacement such that it is true that
if a sentence occurs later in the sequence then it is closer to the
sentence which we want to say is the limit? If the answer is no, then
DF4 will never hold and the sequences described can not be said to
have limit. The problem is that in the sequence 1/2, 1/2 + 1/4, ... we
have a clear sense of what it means to say each succeeding member is
closer to the limit, but in the sequence {$ } it makes no difference
n
whether or $ occurs later in the sequence (this is assuming the
answer to the question posed above is no). If it makes no difference
if occurs before $
.
or vice versa, there can be no sense in saying
one is closer than the other. It would, thus, make little sense to
say the sequence approaches a limit. If the answer to the question
posed is yes, then we have a clear idea of what it means to say a non-
identical proposition is reduced to an identical proposition (provided
4
the conditions stated earlier are satisfied).
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Unfortunately, while the idea expressed in (DFR2) is an interesting
one, it will not be of much help for us, since it is unclear that DF4
will ever be satisfied under the rules given for replacement. Consider
and $
i+1
- ^
i+1
is obtained by replacing some term in $ and the
condition of the replacement is that the concepts of the two terms be
identical. Provided that is not the first member of the sequence,
it could have been obtained from $.
+r There is nothing in the rules
which would lead one to believe that it is possible to arrive at $
i+1
from and not 9
±
from $.
+i>
We might try changing the rules of
replacement to avoid this problem, but it is not clear that we could
change the rules and yet retain an adequate idea of a reduction. Thus,
we must conclude that while this is an interesting approach to the
problem it does not seem to solve it.
Earlier two alternative approaches to the problem that under (DFR)
reductions are finite were discussed. One was to change the defi-
nition of a reduction, and the other was to attempt to clarify what
an analysis of a concept is. We have already discussed the first ap-
proach and it has been suggested that this will not be of much help.
Perhaps if we understand what an analysis of a concept is, we can see
how, under Parkinson's suggestion, some sentences turn out to be con-
tingent. Parkinson asks us to consider the contingent sentence, "The
sun is now shining", and says, "only if the concept of the subject of
the true proposition 'The sun is now shining' is analyzed into a concept
of infinite complexity, describing everything in the universe, can it
be seen how the concept of the subject includes that of the predicate,"
(PI p. 73). Parkinson clarifies the problem somewhat when he indicates
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that an analysis is an, "analysis of a concept into its component con-
cepts," (PI p. 75). If we understand Parkinson correctly, he is sug-
gesting that in contingent sentences the analysis of the concept of
the subject is such that its 'component concepts' are infinitely complex.
One difficulty here is in understanding what Parkinson means by "com-
ponent concepts . Presumably, one of the 'component concepts' of the
concept of man is the concept of animal. Thus, we can say that a 'com-
ponent concept of a concept C is a concept which is either a member
of C or a subset of C. For example, one component concept of the con-
cept of square is the concept of rectangle, since the concept of rec-
tangle is a subset of the concept of square. One of the component
concepts of the concept of the sun is the concept of now shining (where
'now' is a demonstrative referring to a particular time). Parkinson
claims that the concept of the sun is a concept of infinite complexity.
Even if this is true it is difficult to see why we would have to com-
pletely analyze the concept of the sun in order to determine that the
concept of now shining is included in it. It would seem more reasonable
to believe that since the concept of now shining is included in the
concept of the sun we would not have to analyze the concept into a
concept of infinite complexity. We would only have to analyze the
concept enough to see that the concept of now shining is included in
it, which surely is not infinitely complex. Parkinson says, "to explain
the possibility of contingent truths Leibniz need only say, without
being more specific, that there are certain true propositions whose
analysis is infinite," (PI p. 73). But surely the whole problem here
is in trying to understand what it means to say an analysis is infinite.
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One person could claim that in order to see that the concept of the
predicate is included in the concept of the subject in the sentence,
The sun is now shining," an infinite analysis would be required, while
another person could deny this. Neither claim could be shown to be
correct. The notion of what an analysis of a concept is is just too
obscure to be any help.
We must conclude that Parkinson’s attempt to provide for Leibniz
an answer to the analytic-necessary problem fails. While the account
he presents is Leibnizian in certain respects, it does not clearly
answer the objection. Until we can get a clear idea of what an analysis
of a concept is, or until we can make sense of the notion of an infinite
number of operations in a reduction from one proposition to another,
we are simply unable to determine whether Parkinson’s account of Leibniz
really solves the difficulty. Rescher also tries to solve this problem
by using the notion of an infinite analysis. His approach to the problem,
however, is somewhat different from Parkinson’s.
In explaining his view of Leibniz’s theory of contingency, Rescher
makes use of three principles: The Principle of Sufficient Reason,
The Principle of Identity or The Principle of Contradiction, and The
Principle of Perfection or of The Best.^ According to Rescher, The
Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR)
,
"is a principle asserting that,
if a proposition is true
,
then it is possible to show that its predi-
cate is contained in its subject by means of an analysis or demonstration
which need not terminate but may proceed In infinitum (in which case
God alone can carry out the analysis fully)," (Res2 p. 27). In other
words, it is the principle that all true propositions are analytic.
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The Principle of Identity (PI) is that all "finitely 1 ' analytic propo-
sitions are necessarily true. By a "finitely" analytic proposition
Rescher means a proposition such that the concept of the predicate
can be shown to be included in the concept of the subject in a finite
number of steps. The Principle of Perfection (PP) is the principle
that every "infinitely" analytic proposition is contingently true.
An infinitely analytic proposition is one such that it would take an
infinite analysis in order to show that the concept of the predicate
is included in the concept of the subject. Although Rescher’ s view
is somewhat unclear, he basically wants to hold that (PP) is Leibniz's
principle of contingence and, in accord with (PP) God selects the
best possible world. In order to understand this view we must consider
what Rescher says about possible worlds and perfection.
According to Rescher, every "possible substance" is a member of
some possible world, and each of these possible substances has a com-
plete concept which involves its entire history and mirrors the world
of which it is a member. While every possible substance mirrors the
world of which it is a member, different substances in that world have
different degrees of "clarity" at a given state. A state is a particular
time in the development of a substance. At a given state a substance
in a world "perceives" the rest of that world with a certain degree
of clarity. "Let us call the degree of clarity with which at a given
state a possible substance mirrors its universe its amount of perfection
for that state ," (Res2 p. 29). The amount of perfection a possible
substance has is the total amount of perfection it has for all states.
The amount of perfection of a possible world is the total amount of
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perfection of all possible substances which are members of that possible
world. According to The Principle of Perfection, "God selects that
universe for which the amount of perfection is a maximum." 6 Rescher
claims that this enables us to understand the infinite analyticity
of contingent truths. To help us understand the connection between
The Principle of Perfection and infinite analysis, we first look at
Rescher s account of the nature of analysis.
Rescher says:
The Leibnizian 'analysis" of a proposition
about a substance consists of two steps:
1. fo scrutinize the list of properties of
the substance that is the subject of the
proposition in order to determine what
is and what is not included in its com-
plete individual notion.
2. To determine whether the properties im-
puted by the predicate of the proposition
to the substance are in fact included
in this list (or is a derivative of
properties so included). (Resl p. 23)
Rescher' s idea seems to be that the analysis of a sentence like, "Adam
has blond hair," consists of listing the properties contained in the
concept of Adam and checking to see if the property of blond hair is
a member of the list. In certain cases Rescher claims that the analysis
will be infinite. In particular, he claims that the analysis of a
contingent proposition is infinite. He says:
Since true contingent propositions concern contingent
existents . . . the concatenation of subject and predi-
cate asserted by them depends on the nature of existence.
In this way the principle of contingent existence,
the Principle of Perfection, enters into their analysis.
It is via this principle and comparison of perfection
of an infinite number of possible worlds involved in
it, that an infinite process is imported into the
analysis of contingent truths ... A truth of fact is
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such that the state of affairs it asserts is one
elonging to the best of all possible worlds, henceits analysis, which consists in showing that this isindeed so, requires an infinite process of comparison.
(Resl PP . 37-38)
Rescher is not speaking quite accurately when he suggests that for Leibniz
all true contingent propositions concern existents
. with the exception
of God. Leibniz says that the laws of nature, in particular the laws
Gi motlon
>
are also contingent, and the concatenation of subject and
predicate asserted by them can not be thought to depend on the nature
of existence in the way a sentence like, "Adam has blond hair", might
be thought to depend. This is a possible problem for Rescher, if his
account of contingency excludes such propositions. Rescher suggests
here that a sentence is contingently true if the state of affairs it
asserts is one belonging to the best of all possible worlds. But the
connection between this view and the idea that contingent truths require
an infinite analysis is far from clear. Perhaps a better understanding
of The Principle of Perfection will clarify matters.
It is obvious that The Principle of Perfection plays an important
role in Rescher' s account of contingence in Leibniz. Yet Rescher never
definitively states this principle. Sometimes he says that it is the
principle that every infinitely analytic proposition is contingently
g
true, while other times he says:
This principle is a formulation of the thesis that,
in His decision of creation, God acted in the best
possible way; the actual world is that one among
the possible worlds which an infinite process of
comparison showed to be the best.
The existence of an objective criterion of
goodness is a crucial feature of this principle.
(Resl p. 28)
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While these two statements of the principle are in some ways connected,
they clearly do not say the same thing. Rescher also says that The
Principle of Perfection enters into the analysis of propositions con-
cerning contingent existents. If the principle were simply that every
infinitely analytic proposition is contingently true, it would be very
difficult to see how it could enter into any analysis of a contingent
proposition like Adam has blond hair. As it is, seeing how The Principle
of Perfection enters into any analysis is going to be difficult. It
would be more reasonable to say that according to Rescher that every
infinitely analytic proposition is contingently true follows somehow
from The Principle of Perfection. The Principle of Perfection is, then,
that God acted in the best possible way when he created this world.
What role does this principle play in Reseller's account of contingent
truths?
Rescher says that:
A given proposition concerning a contingent
existence is true, and its predicate is indeed
contained in its subject, if the state of affairs
characterized by this inclusion is such that it
involves a greater amount of perfection for the
world than any other possible state. (Res2 p. 30)
In her review of Rescher 's book, Margaret D. Wilson suggests one
gway of understanding him. The sentence, "Adam has blond hair," is
contingent because God created the best of all possible worlds and in
doing so caused the concept of Adam to contain the property of having
blond hair. Adam could have lacked the property of having blond hair
because Adam's concept need not contain that property. Adam's concept
contains the property of having blond hair because God chose the best
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of all possible worlds, but if God had chosen a different world, then
Adam’s concept would not contain the property of having blond hair.
This way of understanding Rescher would seem to account for contingency
in Leibniz in that the proposition that Adam has blond hair is true
because God chose the best of all possible worlds, but would have
been false had God chosen a different world. Wilson criticizes this
view by pointing out that Leibniz tells us that all concepts were
completely formed in God's understanding before God decided which
world to create. The concept of blond hair is included in the concept
of Adam whether or not God chose to create this world. Yet given
the above account of Rescher it would seem that the concept of Adam
is not completely formed until God decides to create this world, for
the concept of blond hair could have or could have not been included
in the concept of Adam, depending on which world God decided to create.
Since God decided to create this world, the concept of blond hair is
included in the concept of Adam. Wilson comments, "This seems to
imply that God, by creating the world in accordance with the Principle
of Perfection causes certain predicates to be included in certain
subject-concepts that would not be included were it not for his de-
cision."^ This view explicitly contradicts what Leibniz says about
complete concepts in, among other places, his correspondence with
Arnauld. There Leibniz says that God created a completely determined
Adam in the sense that the concept of Adam, before God created Adam,
included all the properties Adam would ever have.^ Thus even if the
above view allows for a distinction between necessary and contingent
truths, it is not a view that Leibniz would hold or could consistently hold.
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While Wilson seems to be correct in her criticisms of the view
presented, it seems incorrect to attribute that view to Rescher. While
Rescher's statement of his views is very unclear, and hence open to
numerous interpretations, he does explicitly say, "The existence of
an objective criterion of goodness for possible worlds wholly inde-
pendent of the will of God is a crucial feature of this principle,"
(Resl p. 28; emphasis added). Given Rescher's account of perfection
1
2
in worlds, it is clear that Rescher considers the worlds totally
formed before God makes a choice. Thus, while Wilson's account of
Rescher is one way to interpret him, it seems unfair to him.
There is a more plausible way to understand Rescher than the
account that Wilson presents. Rescher seems to believe that the
contingency of true sentences is closely connected with both The
Principle of Perfection and the notion of infinite analysis. At one
point Rescher says, "A truth of fact is such that the state of affairs
it asserts is one belonging to the best of all possible worlds.
Rescher clearly did not mean for this to be a sufficient condition for
the contingency of true propositions, since all necessary truths are
also such that the state of affairs they assert belongs to the best
of all possible worlds. But this condition, combined with the idea
that contingent truths are infinitely analytic, allows us to present
a reasonable view for Rescher. Let 'S($)' be 'the state of affairs
expressed by $, or the state of affairs asserted by the proposition
expressed by $'. The view being suggested can be expressed as follows:
(DF1) A sentence 4> expresses a contingent true proposition if
and only if S(4>) occurs in the best of all possible worlds
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and $ is infinitely analytic.
A sentence $ expresses a necessary true proposition if
and only if S($) occurs in the best of all possible worlds
and $ is finitely analytic.
A sentence $ expresses a contingent false proposition if
and only if either S($) does not occur in the best of all
possible worlds and $ is infinitely analytic, or not-$ is
infinitely analytic.
A sentence $ expresses a necessary false proposition if
and only if either S($) does not occur in the best of all
possible worlds and $ is finitely analytic, or not-$ is
finitely analytic.
A sentence $ is finitely analytic just in case the concept of the
predicate is included in the concept of the subject and the analysis
of $ occurs in a finite number of steps. A sentence $ is infinitely
analytic just in case the concept of the predicate is included in the
concept of the subject and the analysis of $ does not occur in a finite
number of steps. ^ Reseller's account of the nature of analysis has
already been described , ^ and it is being used here as Rescher uses it.
The view explicated by (DF1) through (DF4) appears to correspond
with the view that, according to Rescher, saves Leibniz from the objec-
tion that God necessarily created the best of all possible worlds. In
order to understand Reseller's proposed solution, we must make his dis-
tinction between "metaphysical perfection" and "moral perfection".
Metaphysical perfection is the amount of potential for existence a
thing has, while moral perfection is the amount of "goodness" a thing
(DF2)
(DF3)
(DF4)
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possesses. According to Rescher, Leibniz believes that God is neces-
sarily perfect, but perfect in the metaphysical sense. Thus it is
supposed to follow from God's essence alone that he exists.^ God
is also morally perfect, but his moral perfection is not necessary.
Rescher says:
God's moral perfection (goodness) has a sufficient
reason, and this in turn another, e_t caetera ad
infinitum
; but this sequence of sufficient reasons
converges on God's metaphysical perfection. Or,
putting this another way, we can say that God’s
moral perfection is indeed a logical consequence
of His metaphysical perfection, but a consequence
which no finite deduction suffices to elicit. In
this way, as Leibniz insists, the proposition as-
serting God's moral perfection is contingent; ...
(Res2 p. 38)
So, according to Rescher the proposition that God is morally perfect
is infinitely analytic, and since it is true in the best of all pos-
sible worlds, it is contingent. But while the analysis of the prop-
osition that God is morally perfect is infinite, Rescher tells us
that it, "converges on God's metaphysical perfection," and is indeed
a logical consequence of God's metaphysical perfection. Thus far
we have not dealt with the problem of the nature of an infinite anal-
ysis, but it is a crucial aspect of the view being suggested.
In describing his account of an analysis, Rescher points out that
in certain cases an analysis of a proposition may be nonterminating
"Analysis of certain propositions will not result in explicit identities;
they are only virtually identical, in that their analysis comes closer
and closer to yielding, but never actually yields, an actual identity.
In a case like this, the analysis "converges" on some actual identity.
But Rescher never explains how an analysis of a proposition can be
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said to "converge" on an explicit identity (by which he n,eans a logical
18
trut ). It is particularly difficult to understand given Reseller’s
account of the nature of analysis. Suppose an analysis is performed
on the proposition that Adam has blond hair. On Rescher's view, one
would start listing the properties in the concept of Adam to determine
whether or not the property of having blond hair is on the list. Even
if the number of properties in the concept is infinite
,
19
if Adam has
blond hair then the property of having blond hair will, sooner or later,
appear on the list. When the property of blond hair does appear on
the list, there will only be a finite number of properties before it.
Thus we can show that Adam has blond hair in a finite number of operations.
This same process could be repeated for any "contingent" true propo-
sition, and hence it appears that all true propositions are necessary.
On Rescher s view it is not clear that there are any infinite analyses,
let alone one that "converges" on some proposition.
It might be possible to avoid this difficulty by changing Rescher’s
account of the nature of an analysis to something which would make
more sense out of the idea of an analysis converging. However, the
only plaudible way to do this seems to be the way discussed earlier
in the account of Parkinson, and we have already seen the problems
involved in that. There appears to be no complete, coherent way of
accounting for contingency in Leibniz in terms of infinite analysis
alone. Rescher's account of Leibniz is more obscure than that of
Leibniz himself, and even under what seems the most reasonable inter-
pretation of Rescher we do not seem to have a solution to the problem.
In the next chapter we will discuss a view of Leibniz presented by
Benson Mates which ignores the notion of an infinite analysis and
concentrates solely on Leibniz’s view of possible worlds to avoid
the analytic-necessary problem.
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CHAPTER III
Benson Mates’ views on Leibniz on necessity and contingency differ
significantly from the views of Rescher and Parkinson. In his expli-
cation of necessity and contingency Mates concentrates solely on Leibniz'
views of concepts and possible worlds and mentions Leibniz's discus-
sions of infinite and finite analysis only to point out the difficulty
in understanding them. Mates also presents his views on Leibniz
more formally in his paper "Leibniz on Possible Worlds" in terms of
a semantics for a formal language. In this chapter, Mates' semantics
will be presented, followed by a discussion of some of the Leibnizian
aspects of it, and, finally, some possible difficulties with his system
will be considered.
In presenting Mates' semantics it is assumed that we have a modal
predicate calculus with identity. The notion of well-formedness is
defined in some usual way. We will, following Mates, restrict the
predicates to one-place predicates (except identity).
Mates' system is based on the Leibnizian notions of "complete
individual concepts", "compossibility"
,
and "possible worlds". "A
comp lete individual concept is a set of simple properties satisfiable
by exactly one thing and containing all the simple properties that
would belong to that thing if it existed," (Ml p. 254). Compossibility
(for Mates) is an equivalence relation which partitions the set of all
complete individual concepts into equivalence classes, which are pos-
sible worlds . There are a denumerably infinite number of possible
2
worlds, each containing infinitely many concepts, also denumerable.
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The individual constants and one-place predicates are interpreted
as follows:
Let f be a function that maps the set of individual constants onto
the set of complete individual concepts (if a is an individual constant,
then f(°0 is the complete individual concept associated with a), f
also maps the set of singulary predicates onto the set of simple pro-
pertxes (if F is a singulary predicate, then f(F) is the simple pro-
perty associated with F)
.
Mates then defines the relation true of in the following way:
For any sentence $, formulas if/, X , constants a, b, predicate F
(other than identity), variable a, and possible world W, then:
(i) If $ is Fa, then $ is true of W iff f(F) e f(a ) and
f(a) e W.
(ii) If $ is a=b, then $ is true of W iff f(a) is f(b) and
f (b) e W.
(iii) If $ is M>, then $ is true of W iff ip is not true of W.
(iv) If $ is (ip -* x), then $ is true of W iff either ip is
not true of W or X is true of W, or both.
(v) If $ is (a)\p
,
then $ is true of W iff t^a/b is true of
W for every individual constant b such that f(b) e W.^
(vi) If $ isn then $ is true of W iff ip is true of every
possible world W'
.
A sentence is a necessary truth iff it is true of all possible worlds.
In Mates' system truth is defined "intensionally" as opposed to
"extensionally"
. In an extensional account of truth, constants are
assigned to objects from the domain (if assigned at all), and predicates
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are assigned sets of objects which are called the "extension of the
predicate". An atomic sentence is true if the object assigned to the
constant (if there is one) is a member of the extension of the predicate.
In an intensional system, predicates are not assigned to sets of
objects, but rather they are assigned to properties. Properties are
the intension of the predicate, and are taken as primitive. Depending
on the system one wanted, constants could then be assigned to sets of
properties as in Mates' system. An atomic sentence is true provided
that the intension of the predicate is a member of the set assigned
to the constant. It is this intensional notion of truth that we find
in Leibniz. He says:
In fact when I consult the conception which I have
of all true propositions, I find that every neces-
sary or contingent predicate, every past, present,
or future predicate, is involved in the concept of
the subject, and I ask no more. (OC p. 117)
The concept of the predicate is always in the sub-
ject of a true proposition. (OC p. 126)
Always in every affirmative proposition whether
veritable, necessary or contingent, the concept
of the predicate is comprised in some sort in that
of the subject. Either the predicate is in the
subject or else I do not know what truth is.(OC p. 132)
If one looks at truth conditions in Mates' semantics, one can see
that this view of truth is indeed included. Consider, for example, the
sentence, "Adam is the first man". Since Mates also wants to account
for certain modal notions (i.e., necessity), all sentences have a truth-
value relative to a possible world, but for our present purposes this
point is not crucial and we can consider the example sentences relative
to this world. "Adam is the first man," is true (of this world) provided
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that the property of being the first man is a member of (or is contained
m) the complete individual concept of Adam, and that concept is a
member of this world. If we symbolize the sentence as Fa where a stands
for "Adam" and F for "is the first man", Fa is true (of this world)
if and only if f(F) (i.e., the property assigned to the predicate F)
is a member of f(a) (i.e., the concept assigned to the constant a),
and f (a) is a member of this world. Thus, in case of atomic sentences
Mates system agrees with Leibniz in intensionality of truth. However,
Leibniz believes that the concept of the predicate is included in the
concept of the subject in all true propositions. Leibniz would hold
that the proposition that every human is an animal is true just in
case the concept of the predicate is included in the concept of the
subject. But in this case it is much more difficult to see how his
definition is supposed to work.
Consider the two sentences, "Adam is human", and "Every human is
an animal". In the first sentence the concept of the subject can be
thought of as a set of properties. Leibniz says that for every substance
there is a complete individual concept which contains all its properties.
He says:
. . . We are able to say that this is the nature of
an individual substance or of a complete being, namely
to afford a conception so complete that the concept
shall be sufficient for the understanding of it and
for the deduction of all the predicates of which the
substance is or may become the subject. (OC p. 13)
In the sentence, "Adam is human", the name "Adam" refers to some indi-
vidual for which there is a complete concept. We can thus talk about
the complete concept of Adam which contains all and only those properties
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which Adam has. Given that the language we are using has the appropriate
connections, the concept of the subject of the sentence "Adam is human"
is the complete concept of Adam. The concept of the predicate in the
sentence "Adam is human" is the property of being human. The sentence
IS true provided that the complete concept of Adam contains the property
of being human.
Leibniz indicates that there are more complete individual concepts
than there are or will be substances. This is because there are com-
plete individual concepts which were never realized by God; i.e., God
never created a substance which corresponded to them. Mates takes
possible worlds to be constituted of these unrealized concepts, rather
than possible substances". But Leibniz often speaks about "possible
individuals or possible persons", which God never created.^* Mates
suggests that we understand Leibniz as talking about unrealized concepts
rather than possible substances" when he speaks of "possible persons".
Mates suggestion is a good one. Leibniz most frequently refers to
possible persons when he is discussing God's choice in creation, saying
that God chooses to create one individual from among many possible indi-
viduals. But Leibniz also refers to God’s choice as a selection from
among concepts. He says, "... I consider the individual concept of
Adam as possible when I maintain that among an infinite of possible
concepts God has selected a certain Adam," (OC pp. 107-108). This indi-
cates that Leibniz did not distinguish between "possible persons" and
what he calls "possible concepts". Leibniz does not believe concepts
are possible, in the sense that God could or could not create them as
he chose. As he says in his discussion of the complete concept of Adam,
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Now, there is no ground for doubting that God can form such a concept,
or rather, that he finds it already formed in the region of possibilities
that is to say, in his understanding," (OC p. 111). So, by "possible
concept" we should understand Leibniz as meaning a concept which God
could realize
. Leibniz further indicates that by "possible persons"
he is referring to concepts and not "possible substances" when he says:
In order to call anything possible it is enough
that we are able to form a notion of it when it is
only in the divine understanding, which is, so to
speak, the region of possible realities. Thus in
speaking of possibles, I am satisfied if veritable
propositions can be formed concerning them. (OC p. 131)
A proposition is true provided that the concept of the subject of the
proposition contains the concept of the predicate of the proposition.
Thus, in order to form true propositions concerning possibles we need
only speak of concepts, and not of "possible substances". If Leibniz
is satisfied with that, there is no reason why we should not be. There-
fore, we will agree with Mates' suggestion and understand Leibniz to
be referring to unrealized complete concepts when he speaks of pos-
sible individuals.
Given this view of possible individuals it is natural to assume,
as Mates suggests, that possible worlds are made up not of individuals,
but rather of concepts, and only in the real world are these concepts
actualized. Not all concepts are actualized for the reason that not
all possibles are, as Leibniz puts it, "compossible" . Intuitively, by
"compossible" Leibniz means compatible. For example, if concept x
contains the properties of being the first man and having red hair,
and concept y contains the properties of being the first man and having
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blond hair, it seems reasonably clear that x and y could not be realised
together. In any world there can be only one first man and he can have
either red hair or blond hair, but not both. Thus Leibniz holds each
world to be a collection of compossible possibles. He says:
The Universe is only the collection of a certain
kind of compossibles
; and the actual Universe is
the collection of all existant possibles, i.e.,
of that which form the richest compound. And as
there are different combinations of possibles, some
better than others, there are many possible Uni-
verses, each collection of compossibles making
one of them.
p 223)
Mates tries to incorporate the Leibnizian idea that possible
worlds are simply collections of compossibles in his semantics. Mates
says, Individual concepts are said to be compossible if they are
capable of joint realization," (Ml p. 511). Mates later continues:
One sees, therefore, that the relation of
compossibility between individual concepts, unlike
that of consistency between sentences or propositions,
is transitive; since it is also reflexive and
symmetrical it is an equivalence relation. As
noted above, the possible worlds are ’maximal*
or ’closed' with respect to this relation; so
they are just the equivalence classes into which
the relation of compossibility partitions the
entire class of complete individual concepts. Thus,
each such concept belongs to one and only one
possible world, and two concepts are compossible
if and only if they belong to the same possible
world. (Ml pp. 511-512)
Mates appears to be on the right track, but there are some difficulties
with his treatment of compossibility. According to Mates, compossibility
is a two-place relation among concepts. X is compossible with Y just
in case X and Y can be realized together. Mates says the compossibility
relation is reflexive and symmetrical, which it clearly is, and also
transitive. Initially, it is difficult to see why the relation would
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be transitive. Surely it could be the case that X and Y can be realized
together and Y and Z be realized together, and X and Z can not be realized
together. Suppose X and Z both contain the property of being the only
man seven feet tall and they differ with respect to some other property.
Further suppose that Y contains the property of being six feet tall as
well as others. There is no inconsistency in X and Y being realized
together, nor in Y and Z being realized together, yet it is clear that
X and Z cannot be realized together. Since counter-examples of this
type seem so obvious, why does Mates believe compossibility to be tran-
sitive and hence an equivalence relation? In a later paper, "individuals
and Modality in the Philosophy of Leibniz", Mates considers this point
and says:
It is blocked by the Leibnizian doctrine that in
the actual world and in every other possible world,
each concept 'mirrors' or 'expresses' all the other
individual concepts in that world. Each individual
of the actual world is related to all the others,
and every relation is 'grounded' in simple attributes
of the things related; the same is true of the other
possible worlds as well. (M2 p. 91)
Mates is correct in believing that Leibniz holds that every concept
mirrors or expresses the world of which it is a member. Leibniz often
says things like, "Now every individual substance of this universe
expresses in its concept the universe into which it has entered," (OC
p. 109). But this relation of mirroring between concepts is obscure.
Mates believes that the mirroring relation will yield the result
that compossibility is an equivalence relation. The idea is that if
concept A mirrors concept B, then for any property P that is contained
in B it can be shown from A that P is contained in B. For example,
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m the case suggested above Y might contain the property of being six
feet tall and X is the only man seven feet tall. Y would no longer
be compossible with Z, since Y cannot be realized without X's being
realized, and X and Z are not compossible. Given this idea of mir-
roring, Mates is right that compossibility will be an equivalence
relation which partitions the set of complete concepts into equivalence
classes. But at this point we are faced with another difficulty. It
is not clear that we should identify possible worlds with these equiv-
alence classes, which is what Mates wants to do.
The problem with this is that while the members of a given equiv-
alence class are pair-wise compossible, the set itself may not be pos-
sible (i.e., not all the members can be realized together). Consider
the following case: Suppose X contains, among other things, being the
only man at place P at time t, Y contains being the only man at place
Q at time t when X is the only man at place P at time t, and Z contains
being the only man at place Q at time t, where X, Y and Z are distinct
concepts. X is compossible with Y and Y is compossible with Z and Z
is compossible with X, yet X, Y and Z cannot be realized together. One
might say that the possible worlds are just certain subsets of the equiv-
alence classes, but then there is a problem about worlds being "maximal"
in the appropriate sense. If worlds are not maximal, then it seems
clear that a concept can be a member of two distinct worlds. It is
more likely that Mates would say that mirroring handles this problem,
and X, Y and Z cannot really be pair-wise compossible. Whether or not
the relation of mirroring can do this depends in part on how one defines
mirroring, which Mates does not do. However, for present purposes we
will assume one can define mirrorl„8 i„ tha appropriate Kay and gQ ^
to consider Mates account of necessary truth.
In order to understand Mates* account of necessary truth we must
again briefly look at his account of truth for atomic sentences. As
pointed out earlier, a sentence is true relative to a given possible
world. The sentence,
-Adam has blond hair," is true of a world (say)
Wi jUSt ^ 0356 the C°nCeP t of blond ^ir is included in the concept
of Adam and the concept of Adam is a member of W.. The sentence is
necessarily true just in case it is true of all possible worlds. It
can be easily seen that on Mates' account of Leibniz it is not the
case that all true sentences are necessary. Consider the sentence,
Adam has blond hair," and suppose Adam really did have blond hair
and he really did exist. The sentence, "Adam has blond hair," is true
of this world since the concept of Adam is a member of this world and
has the concept of blond hair as a member. However, it will not be
true of all possible worlds because the concept of Adam will not be
a member of all possible worlds. The reason the concept of Adam is
not a member of all possible worlds is that possible worlds are simply
the equivalence classes which are partitioned off the set of all con-
cepts by the relation of compossibility
. Thus Adam's concept is only
a member of one of those worlds, namely this one. Thus if the sentence
"Adam has blond hair," is true of this world, it must be false of all
other possible worlds. If the sentence is true of one world and false
of all others, it is contingent. This does not mean that all sentences
in which the concept of the subject is not a member of a given world
are false of that world. Complex sentences can be true of a world
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even though the concept of the subject is not a member of that world.
Consider the sentence, "Either Caesar crossed the Rubicon or Caesar
did not cross the Rubicon." This sentence will be true of all pos-
sible worlds (and hence a necessary truth) even though the concept of
Caesar is a member of only one world. To see this, consider the world
(presumably this one) which has as a member the concept of Caesar. In
this world the sentence will be true because Caesar did in fact cross
the Rubicon, thus one of the disjuncts is satisfied. The concept of
Caesar is not a member of any other world, and thus the other disjunct
will be satisfied in those worlds, since in order to satisfy it, it
only has to be the case that the concept of Caesar not be a member
of the world. Thus the sentence in question does express a necessary
truth. However, it should be noted that only complex sentences can
express necessary truths; all true atomic sentences are contingent.
Basically, the reason it turns out that all true atomic sentences
are contingent is that for an atomic sentence to be true of a world
the concept of the subject must be a member of the world in question.
Mates treats truth this way in his semantics because of a view he at-
tributes to Leibniz about non-referring names. In his first paper,
Mates presents the Leibnizian principle, "Nothing has no properties,"
and says, "The point is rather that Leibniz’s advocacy of this principle
amounts in practice to a decision to regard as false every atomic
sentence that contains a nondenoting name," (Ml p. 514). However, it
is far from clear that Leibniz actually held this view, and the evidence
Mates presents to support it is inconclusive.
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Mates bases his view that Leibniz believed that all sentences
with nondenoting names are false, in part, upon the following passage
in Leibniz:
Hoc autem praesupponit negari omnem propositionem,
quam ingreditur terminus qui non est res. Ut scilicet
maneat omnem propositionem vel veram vel falsam esse,
falsam autem omnem esse cui deest constantia subjecti,
seu terminus realis. (C p. 393 )
Mates presents the following translation of the above:
This however presupposes denying every proposition
in which there is a term that does not exist. In
order, namely, to keep (the principle) that every
proposition is true or false, (I consider) as false
every proposition that lacks an existent subject
or real term. (M2 p. 93)
Parkinson, in his book Leibniz : Logical Papers
,
translates the
exact same passage somewhat differently. His translation reads:
But this presupposes that every proposition which
has as an ingredient a term which is not a thing
is denied. So it remains that every proposition
is either true or false, but that every proposition
which lacks a consistent subject, i.e. a real term,
is false. (P2 p. 82)
The differences between the translations of Mates and Parkinson
are important ones. In particular, Mates translates "constantia subjecti"
as "existent subject" while Parkinson translates it as "consistent
subject". This difference in translation is highly significant. If
Parkinson is correct, then it seems that Leibniz is going to consider
6
false every atomic sentence in which there is an inconsistent term.
By "inconsistent term" we mean a term which has associated with it a
concept that is not consistent. ^ Thus, for example, the sentence, "The
round square is round," would be false. Yet this does not say anything
about terms which do not -refer in the real world but do refer in some
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other possible world. If, on the other hand. Mates is correct in his
translation, and we assume that by "existent subject" Leibniz means a
subject such that its referent exists in the real world, then Leibniz
is saying he will consider false every atomic sentence in which there
is a term which does not refer in this world. Mates generalizes this
idea and says that if the concept of the subject of an atomic sentence
is not a member of the world at which the sentence is being evaluated,
then the sentence is false. But is Mates correct in his interpretation
of Leibniz, or is Parkinson closer to what Leibniz meant?
The key to understanding Leibniz here seems to be when Leibniz
indicates that constantia subjecti" means the same as "terminus realis".^
It seems that for Leibniz "real term" means nothing more than "possible
term", that is, a term which has a consistent concept. If in fact
Leibniz does mean this, then Parkinson's interpretation is the correct
one. Moreover, there is other evidence to indicate that Leibniz did
not want to say that all atomic sentences without an existent subject
are false. In discussing his view of logic as opposed to the view of
The Scholastics, he says, "However, I have preferred to consider universal
concepts, i.e., ideas, and their combinations, as they do not depend
on the existence of individuals," (P2 p. 20).^ This is part of the
reason why Leibniz wanted an intensional account of truth rather than
an extensional one. Mates considers Leibniz's holding the principle,
"Nothing has no properties," as evidence that Leibniz wanted to con-
sider, "false every atomic sentence that contains a non-denoting name,"
(Ml p. 514). But given what Leibniz says about nothing, it appears
that there is more evidence for Parkinson's position. Leibniz says,
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''Nihil est quicquid nominari potest, cogitari non potest, nomen sine
re, sine mente sonus. That is. Nothing is that which can be named
but can not be conceived; a name without a thing, a sound without a
meaning. This suggests that names which have associated with them
a concept which can not be realized (i.e., an inconsistent concept)
denote nothing. Atomic sentences containing such names will be false.
One intuitive way of understanding the relationship between names such
as "Adam" and the complete concept of Adam is that the concept is the
meaning of the name or the intension of the name. The referent, deno-
tation, or extension of the name is the man Adam. Names such as "Pegasus"
which do not refer or have an extension in this world are still con-
sidered real terms because they have a consistent intension or meaning.
Terms such as "the round square" are not real terms, since the meaning
of the term is inconsistent. It seems reasonably clear that when
Leibniz speaks of nothing as a name without a thing, the names he has
in mind are like "the round square". Thus, when Leibniz says he is
going to consider false every proposition which lacks a constantia
sub jecti
,
we should understand him as saying that atomic sentences
containing inconsistent terms are false.
One of the results of Mates' misinterpretation of Leibniz is the
second conjunct in his truth conditions for atomic sentences. By it-
self, this is not a very powerful objection to Mates' system. However,
it leads to certain results in Mates' system which Leibniz would find
unacceptable
.
There are at least two results of Mates' system that it seems
Leibniz would disagree with, and one result of possible disagreement.
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They are, (a) the fact that in Mates (Ex)QFx is always false, (b)
O' Fa + D L(Ex) (x=a) -> Fa]] is a necessary truth, and (c) Q (a^a) is
t 12a necessary truth. It is not clear whether Leibniz would disagree
with Mates about the fact that (Ex)QFx is always false. There are places
in Leibniz which suggest that he held that certain properties of things
are possessed of necessity. For example, he says, "I think that there
is something essential to individuals and more than you suppose. It
is essential to substances to act, to created substances to suffer, to
minds to think, to bodies to have extension and motion." 13 But while
he says that there are certain things essential to individuals, it is
unclear whether he means particular individuals or individuals in
general. The context suggests that he is referring to particulars,
but it is inconclusive. When discussing the problem of contingency
with Arnauld
,
he says:
The other reply is that the sequence, in virtue of
which events follow from the hypothesis, is indeed
always certain, but that it is not always necessary
by a metaphysical necessity, as is that instance
which is founded in M. Arnaud's example: that God,
resolving to create me, could not avoid creating a
nature capable of thought. The sequence is often
only physical and presupposes certain free decrees
of God. . . . (OC pp. 104-105)
This passage suggests that Leibniz believes he has the property of
being capable of thought necessarily. Leibniz says that from the hypo-
thesis, which is that God will create a certain Adam, and hence the
world, all the events which follow are certain, but not all are necessary.
Some are contingent, and some are necessary, such as Leibniz's being
capable of thought. The interesting point here is that Leibniz wants
to distinguish between his having the property of being capable of
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thought and his having other properties, such as the property of having
black hair. We suggest that Leibniz believes that it is metaphysically
necessary that God, resolving to create Leibniz, could not avoid Leibniz's
being capable of thought, yet it is not metaphysically necessary that
God, resolving to create Leibniz, could not avoid Leibniz's having
black hair. How it is possible that Leibniz could consistently hold
this view is discussed in detail in the next chapter, but if he does,
then (a) would seem to be something Leibniz would reject.
This objection to Mates is based on one way of reading (Ex)CIFx,
namely, where the sentence is understood as saying there is something
in this world which is such that it has a certain property of necessity.
One could understand ( Ex ) Fx via Mates as saying there is something
in this world such that in every world it exists and has a certain
property. But if we read (Ex)OFx in the latter way, then how will
we translate the sentence, "There is something which is such that it
has property F of necessity"? Surely this sentence should be translatable
into the formal language of a given system. Unless we understand (Ex)OFx
as its translation, there appears to be no other way to translate it.
We can show that (b) is true by assuming O Fa. Thus, by assumption
Fa is true of some world (say) W^. Thus f(F) e f(a) and f(a) e W^.
Also (W)(W ^ W^ -> f(a) i W) , since every complete individual concept
is in only one world. This is because a world is an equivalence class
of complete individual concepts partitioned off the set of all complete
individual concepts by the relation of compossibility . Q[(Ex)(x=a) -* FaJ
says that (Ex) x=a -+ Fa is true of every world. (Ex)(x=a) -* Fa is true
of a world just in case either (Ex)(x=a) is not true of that world or
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Fa is true. (Ex) (x-a) is not true of a world just in case there is
no constant b, such that f(b) is in that world and b=a is true of that
world. The only worlds of which b=a is true are those worlds such
that f (a) is a member of them. But as we have shown f(a) is a member
of only one world, hence for all worlds other than W
,
(Ex) (x=a) -> Fa
is true of them. In W 1? Fa is true, hence (Ex) (x=a) -* Fa is true of
every world. Thus
,
[(Ex) (x=a) -> Fa[j and finally, O Fa -> o| (Ex) (x=a)->Faj
.
(c) also is a necessary truth in Mates' system. Assume there is
some W in w7hich (c) is false, i.e., assume Q (a=a) (for some constant
a_) is true of W. If Q (a=a) is true of W, then for every W^,(a=a)
is true of W . In order for a=a to be true of any world, f(a) must
be a member of that world. Since f(a) is a member of only one world,
there will be some world such that f(a) is not a member of it. Thus,
it is false that for every W^, (a=a) is true of W^. The reason I
point out that (b) and (c) are necessary truths in Mates' system is
because they indicate a difficulty in accepting Mates' system as an
appropriate Leibnizian semantics. The difficulty is one of translation
and interpretation.
Consider the following sentence:
(1) If it is possible that Adam has black hair, then necessarily
if Adam exists, he has black hair.
It seems that Leibniz would want to deny (1) since from the claim that
it is possible that Adam has black hair and Adam exists, it follows
that Adam in fact has black hair (I am assuming that Adam has blond
hair) . Leibniz would clearly agree that it is possible that Adam has
black hair and certainly wants to claim Adam exists (in the timeless
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sense), yet he would disagree that Adam in fact had black hair. Making
the appropriate assumptions about the predicate letters and constant
letters in (b)
,
then it would appear that (b) is the translation into
the formal language of (1). One would think that the semantics Mates
presents would reflect Leibniz's unacceptance of (1). However, what
Mates semantics reflects is that (b) interpreted in his system is
something Leibniz would accept. (b) interpreted in Mates' system
says, if the concept of Adam is a member of some world and that concept
contains the property of having black hair, then in every world in
which the concept of Adam is a member (there is only one such world),
the concept contains the property of having black hair. Leibniz would
agree with this statement. It should also be pointed out that we
cannot conclude that Adam has black hair in Mates' system given our
assumptions about Adam (namely that he exists and has blond hair), since
O Fa is false in the system. Mates might deny that (b) is the trans-
lation of (1), but if he does it becomes unclear whether he can trans-
late (1) at all. At least it is unclear what the translation would
be if not (b) . A more likely response from Mates would be that this
is not a difficulty, since Leibniz would not deny (1). Mates would
hold that Leibniz would accept the claim that if Adam does not have
black hair, then it is not possible that he have black hair. Mates
would base this view on some of the things Leibniz has to say about
complete concepts.
For example, Leibniz says:
. . . if, in the life of any person, and even in
the whole universe, anything went differently from
what it has, nothing would prevent us from saying
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that it was another person or another possible
universe which God had chosen. It would then
indeed be another individual. (M2 p. 105)
Mates would take the above quote as evidence for the claim that Leibniz
held that if Adam lacked black hair, it is not possible that he have
black hair. Yet at many places Leibniz points out that just because
Adam has a certain property in his concept, it does not follow that
Adam has that property of necessity. However, in order to show con-
clusively that (b) is a difficulty for a Leibnizian semantics, one
must point out a way of understanding Leibniz's views of complete
concepts, compossibility
,
and possible worlds, which makes the above
quote consistent with (1).
A way of understanding Leibniz which allows for this possibility
is suggested in the next two chapters. The problem with (c) is similar
to the problem with (b), although (c)'s being a necessary truth seems
to constitute a stronger objection to Mates than (b)'s being a neces-
sary truth.
If we let a. in (c) stand for "Adam", then it appears that (c) is
the translation of:
(2) It is possible that Adam not be Adam.
Even if Leibniz would not deny (1), it seems he would deny (2). At
one time Leibniz tells us that all identical propositions are necessary.
He then later adds a condition for the truth of identical propositions.
He says:
As it is agreed that identical propositions
themselves can be trusted only in the case of real
concepts, so that no truth can be asserted without
fear of the opposite except concerning the reality
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of those concepts themselves—at any rate their
essential reality, though not their existential
reaiity
... (P2 p . 8 2)
Leibniz is saying that identical propositions can be trusted only in
the cases where the concepts involved are consistent or possible.^
But if the concepts involved are "real" concepts, then the identical
proposition will be necessary. As mentioned in the discussion of
Parkinson, identical propositions for Leibniz are not just propo-
sitions expressed by identity sentences. However it is clear that the
proposition that Adam is Adam is included among the propositions that
Leibniz calls identical". Thus, it is reasonably clear that Leibniz
would say that it is necessary that Adam is Adam, which contradicts
(2) . It seems unlikely that Mates would claim (c) is not the trans-
lation of (2) . A more likely response would be for him to deny that
(2) is false.
Mates believes that just as all atomic sentences containing a
non-referring expression are false, so are all identity sentences
containing a non-referring expression. He holds that Leibniz believes
identity sentences have "existential import". That is, if an identity
sentence is true, then the terms in the identity sentence denote an
object. Mates supports this view, in part, by pointing out that Leibniz
says, "Thus, if I say of an existing thing, 'A is B’
,
it is the same
as if I were to say 'AB is an existent’; e.g., ’Peter is a denier’,
I O
i.e., ’Peter denying is an existent' ,"(P2 p. 65). But it is not
clear that Leibniz here means what Mates is implying. Leibniz is only
discussing sentences in which the subject term refers to some object.
This passage does not tell us what Leibniz thought about sentences
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such as, "Pegasus is Pegasus". The problem that Leibniz is considering
is how to handle the problem of existence given his definition of truth.
Thus he says, immediately following what is quoted above, "The question
here is how one is to proceed in analysing this; i.e. whether the term
'Peter denying' involves existence, or whether 'Peter existent' involves
denial or whether 'Peter' involves both existence and denial, as if
you were to say, 'Peter is an actual denier', i.e. is an existent
denier; which is certainly true," (P2 p. 65). In the end Leibniz
says Peter involves both existence and denial, but what we are inter-
ested in is that Leibniz is not claiming that all sentences (and
m particular identity sentences) are false unless they have a term
which refers to an object.
There is additional evidence to support the belief that Leibniz
thinks sentences of the form "a is a" are always true. He says:
(154) But if someone prefers signs to be used in
such a way that AB=AB, whether AB is a thing or not,
and that in the case in which AB is not a thing, B
and not-B can coincide—namely, per impossible—
I
do not object. This will have as a consequence the
need to distinguish between a term and a thing or
entity
.
(155) All things considered, then, it will perhaps
be better for us to say that, in symbols at least,
we can always put A=A, though nothing is usefully
concluded from this when A is not a thing.
(P2 p. 82)
When Leibniz says in (155) 'A is not a thing* it is clear from what he
says in (154) that he means A is impossible. So, what Leibniz is sug-
gesting is that even if the term A has associated with it an inconsistent
concept we can still say "A=A" . If the term A has associated with it
a consistent concept, then the sentence will be true. Almost everything
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Leibniz says between (151) and (156) (P2 pp. 81-82) suggests that he
holds that "A=A" is true when the concept associated with A is consistent.
Mates himself seems to agree to a certain extent when he allows that
Pegasus is Pegasus" is true in some world even though "Pegasus" does
not denote any object in any world on his view. But Mates' view seems
too restrictive in its account of truth, and sentences like (c) become
necessary truths.
Perhaps one should refrain from making any final judgements about
Mates' system until the merits of an alternative account can be compared
with it. Mates does incorporate many of Leibniz's views in his system,
and he does suggest a way to avoid the problem of contingency. In the
next chapter we will take a close look at Leibniz's views on these
matters and compare our interpretation of Leibniz with that of Parkinson,
Rescher and Mates.
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NOTES FOR CHAPTER III
1. See M2 pp. 98-99.
2. Ml pp. 524-525.
3. For any formula ip, variable a, constant b, \pa/b is the result
of replacing all occurrences of a in ip by occurrences of b.
4. OC p. 80.
5. NE p. 516.
6. I say atomic sentence because we do not want Fa and %Fa to both
be false.
7. A concept is consistent provided that it is a subset of some
complete individual concept.
8. A term a refers in a world W just in case the concept associated
with a is a member of W.
9. Leibniz also says, "Is every universal negative, then impossible?
It seems that it is because it is understood of concepts, and
not of existing things; thus if I say that no man is an animal,
I do not understand this of existing men alone," (P2 p. 76).
10. For another discussion of what "constantia subjecti" means in
this passage see Ishiguro, Hide", Leibniz ’s Philosophy of Logic
and Langua ge, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1972, pp. 128-130.
My conclusions on this subject are the same as Ishiguro’ s.
11. Leibniz, G.W., Samtliche Schriften und Briefe
,
herausgegeben von
der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaf ten zu Berlin, 1923,
Volume II, Series 6, p. 487.
12. The symbols ’F f and 'a* stand for any predicate letter and any
constant letter in Mates’ system respectively. Because there
will be no ambiguity between use and mention in discussing these
formulas, I have left off the quotation marks which would usually
accompany them.
13. NE P* 331.
14. OC pp. 19-20, 125-126.
15. P2 P-. 77.
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16. For what Leibniz means by "essential reality" as opposed to
existential reality", see P2 pp. 80-81.
17. See P- 29.
18. M2 pp.. 94-95.

In the discussion of the various views that certain philosophers
attributed to Leibniz and in the discussion about God, various aspects
of Leibniz's position have been mentioned. In this section will be
an attempt to present a coherent interpretation of Leibniz which takes
into account most of the Leibnizian doctrines discussed. We will try
to present as clearly as possible Leibniz's account of necessity and
contingency, by considering what Leibniz says in various places and
presenting it in a consistent way. Since Leibniz has never written
a single major work on the topic, the closest thing coming to that
being the Theodicy
,
we must consider what Leibniz says in his cor-
respondence and in various articles. The two major sources for the
view suggested for Leibniz are the correspondence with Arnauld and
the Theodicy
. These are not the only sources, but they are the major
ones being considered. In presenting this view there will be some
repetition of material presented in previous chapters, but this does
seem necessary to present a complete picture of Leibniz on this topic.
One of the basic views of Leibniz, and one he affirms often, is
his definition of truth. Moreover, it is in part his definition of
truth which leads one to believe there is no contingency in Leibniz.
For, Leibniz says that a proposition is true just in case the concept
of the predicate is included in the concept of the subject. In effect,
Leibniz holds that every true proposition is analytic.^ Herein lies
the difficulty: if all true propositions are analytic, then surely
it follows that all true propositions are necessary, since all analytic
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propositions are necessary. Yet Leibniz denies that all true propo-
sitions are necessary. On the face of it, this position seems incon-
sistent, yet a close examination of Leibniz's views will reveal there
is no inconsistency.
Truth is defined in terms of inclusion; the concept of the pre-
dicate being included in the concept of the subject. As mentioned
m the preceeding chapter, for Leibniz the concept of the subject
can be thought of as a set of properties. 2 If the subject is an
individual thing, then the concept is complete. Possible worlds
are sets of complete concepts as described in the preceeding section. ;
Leibniz introduces "possible worlds" and the like to explain creation
in part, but they also help in understanding necessity.
In responding to a charge by Arnauld, Leibniz says:
If what I said be thought over a little it will
be found to be evident ex terminis : for by the
individual concept, Adam, I mean of course a per-
fect representation of a particular Adam who has
certain individual characteristics and is thus
distinguished from an infinity of possible persons
very similar to him yet for all that different
from him (as ellipses always differ from the circle,
however closely they may approach it). God has
preferred him to these others because it has pleased
God to choose precisely such an arrangement of
the universe, and everything which is a consequence
of this resolution is necessary only by hypothet-
ical necessity and by no means destroys the freedom
of God nor that of the created spirits. There is
a possible Adam whose posterity is of a certain
sort, and an infinity of other possible Adams whose
posterity would be otherwise; now is it not true
that these possible Adams (if we may speak of them
thus) differ among themselves and that God chose
only one who is precisely ours? (OC p. 80)
If we ignore for the moment the difficulties presented in Chapter I
in connection with God, it seems that Leibniz is saying that what
80
follows from God's decision to create this world is not necessary (in
the metaphysical sense). In particular, it is not the case that all
true statements about Adam are necessary since there are other "pos-
sible Adams" very similar to the real Adam which God might have chosen
to realize instead of the real Adam. The idea is that Adam does not
have (say) blond hair of necessity because there is a possible Adam which
is very similar to the real Adam, and this possible Adam lacks blond
hair. This appears to be what Leibniz means when he says, "an infinity
of other possible Adams whose posterity would be otherwise," (0C p. 80).
Leibniz does indicate that a sentence such as, "Adam has blond hair",
is hypothetically necessary. By this Leibniz means that it is neces-
sary (in the metaphysical sense) that if God creates Adam, then Adam
has blond hair. But this is hardly surprising, since included in the
concept of the real Adam is the concept of blond hair. Given that God
is going to realize the concept of the real Adam, the real Adam must
have blond hair since it is in his concept. Thus, the reason it is
contingent that Adam has blond hair is that there are these "possible
Adams" which are similar to the real Adam yet lack blond hair. But does
it even make sense to talk about "possible Adams"?
In the preceding section it was argued for that Leibniz’s "pos-
sible individuals" were unrealized complete individual concepts in other
possible worlds.^ When such terms as "possible persons", or "possible
Adams" are used, no more is meant than unrealized complete individual
concepts in other possible worlds (except in the case of the "possible
Adam" or "possible person" which is in fact actual). Arnauld objects
to Leibniz's position that there are an "infinity of other possible
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Adams on the grounds that such a view in conjunction with Leibniz's
view of complete individual concepts is inconsistent. Arnauld says:
Moreover, Monsieur, I do not see how, in taking
Adam as an example of a unitary nature, several
possible Adams can be thought of. It is as though
I should conceive of several possible me's; a thing
which is certainly inconceivable. For I am not
able to think of myself without considering myself
as a unitary nature, a nature so completely dis-
tinguished from every other existent or possible
being that I am as little able to conceive of several
me s as to think of a circle all of whose diameters
are not equal. The reason is that these various
me's are different, one from the other, else there
would not be several of them. There would have
to be, therefore, one of these me's which would not
be me, an evident contradiction. (OC p. 94)
Arnauld continues and says:
Is it not clear that . . . since my present me
is necessarily of a certain individual nature,
which is the same thing as having a certain indi-
vicual concept, it will be as impossible to conceive
of contradictory predicates in the individual
concept me, as to conceive of a me different from
me? (OC pp. 94-95)
Transferring what Arnauld says about himself here to Adam, he seems
to be saying something like the following: there is a unique complete
concept of Adam. If there are several possible Adams, there must be
at least two complete concepts of Adam which are distinct. But, since
the complete concept of Adam is distinct from all other concepts,
there can not be two complete concepts of Adam. Thus it is not the
case that there are several possible Adams. Leibniz responds to
this objection by saying:
. . . in speaking of several Adams I do not take
Adam for a determined individual but for a certain
person conceived sub ratione generalitatis under
the circumstances which appear to us to determine
Adam as an individual but which do not actually
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determine him sufficiently. As if we should mean
by Adam the first man, whom God set in a garden
of pleasure whence he went out because of sin,
and from whose side God fashioned a woman. All
this would not sufficiently determine him and
there might have been several Adams separately
possible or several individuals to whom that
would apply. This is true, whatever finite number
of predicates incapable of determining all the
rest might be taken, but that which determines
a certain Adam ought to involve absolutely all
his predicates, and it is this complete concept
which determines the particular individual. (OC pp. 128-129)
Leibniz wants to label possible persons who are very similar to
Adam as possible Adams, but he does not want to claim that they are
in any sense the same Adam as the real Adam. This becomes clear
when Leibniz says, "as if we should mean by Adam the first man, whom
God set in a garden of pleasure . . . there might have been several
Adams separately possible or several individuals to whom that would
apply," (OC p. 129). Thus Leibniz is agreeing with Arnauld that
there is only one complete concept of Adam. But there are other
complete concepts which are unrealized and which are very similar
to the concept of Adam in that they contain a number of the properties
that the concept of Adam contains. They do not contain all and only
those properties that the concept of Adam contains, otherwise we would
be talking about a single concept rather than many concepts. Leibniz
refers to these concepts which are similar to, but not identical with
the concept of Adam when he talks about "possible Adams".
Some contemporary terminology will now be introduced to avoid
continually using the phrase "possible persons very similar to Adam".
Hereafter these possible persons will be referred to as "counterparts'
of Adam. The use of such terminology is not completely unwarranted,
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given what Leibniz's position seems to be. One must keep in mind,
however, that "counterparts” as used here does not mean exactly the
same thing as used in contemporary philosophy. The expression "counter-
parts of Adam" will be used to refer to those unrealized concepts
which are very similar to the concept of Adam; the ones to which it
appears Leibniz was referring. Thus the counterpart relation in
the Leibnizian sense is a relation between concepts
, not individuals.
A more standard usage would have the relation between individuals.
It seems that Leibniz, through the use of counterparts, can allow
for contingency. Before a more detailed account of the use of counter-
parts by Leibniz in allowing for contingency is given, however, we
will consider a more complete picture of the problem facing Leibniz.
We will then suggest a way that counterparts can solve the difficulties.
As suggested in the beginning of this section, while Leibniz
claimed there are true contingent propositions it is not clear that
he can consistently hold that view given his definition of truth.
According to Leibniz, all true propositions are analytic. That is,
the concept of the subject contains the concept of the predicate in
any true proposition. The sentence, "Adam has blond hair", expresses
a true proposition provided that the concept associated with the name
Adam (in some sense the "meaning" of the name Adam" includes the
concept associated with the predicate "has blond hair". The propo-
sition that Adam has blond hair is analytic because its truth depends
solely on the concepts involved in the proposition.
Since all analytic propositions are necessary, it seems to follow
on Leibniz's view that all true propositions are necessary. In order
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to consistently hold that there are true contingent propositions,
Leibniz must either give up his definition of truth, claim that it
does not follow from his definition of truth that all true propo-
sitions are analytic, or claim that it is not the case that all
analytic propositions are necessary. Leibniz clearly did not want
to give up his definition of truth, and given that definition of truth
there seems no way for him to deny that all true propositions are
analytic. But if Leibniz can consistently deny that all analytic
propositions are necessary, then he can consistently hold that there
are true contingent propositions. However, it is unclear whether Leibniz
can consistently deny that all analytic propositions are necessary.
Since complete individual concepts are sets of properties, they are
defined in extension, or by their members. If one adds a member to
a set, then one would have a different set, and if one takes a member
away from a set, then one would have a different set. Because sets
are defined in extension, they necessarily have the members they have.
Since in order for a true proposition to be contingent it must be
possible, that the proposition not be true, it seems as if there must
be a case such that the concept of the predicate is contained in the
concept of the subject, yet it is possible that the concept of the
predicate not be contained in the concept of the subject. But it
is not clear that this is possible, since any particular concept
can not change its members. It would be possible if there were more
than one concept associated with the subject of a sentence, but Leibniz
clearly indicates that there may only be one. Leibniz allows that where
the subject of the sentence refers to a substance, we can discuss subsets
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of the concept of the substance (i.e., conceive of it sub ratione
general itatis ). there is only one complete concept of the substance,
however, and that is the concept which is associated with the subject
of a sentence which is about the substance. Thus, contrary to what
Leibniz says, it appears that there are no true contingent propositions
Leibniz recognizes the difficulty in his system yet still believes
that he can allow for contingency. In his paper "On Freedom" he says:
I found myself very close to the opinions of
those who hold everything to be absolutely neces-
sary; believing that when things are not subject
to coercion, even though they are to necessity,
there is freedom, and not distinguishing between
the infallible, or what is known with certainty
to be true, and the necessary.
But I was pulled back from this precipice
by considering those possible things which neither
are nor will be nor have been. For, if certain
possible things never exist, existing things
cannot always be necessary; otherwise it would be
impossible for other things to exist in their
place, and whatever never exists would therefore
be impossible. For it cannot be denied that many
stories, especially those we call novels, may
be regarded as possible, even if they do not ac-
tually take place in this particular sequence
of the universe which God has chosen. (L pp. 404-405)
Here Leibniz suggests that there is contingency because there are
possible things which could have existed in the place of the things
which actually exist. This becomes even clearer when he says:
Thus it is obvious that God elects from an infinity
of possible individuals those whom he judges best
suited to the supreme and secret ends of his wisdom.
In an exact sense, he does not decree that Peter
should sin or Judas be damned but only that, in
preference to other possible individuals, Peter,
who will sin—certainly indeed, yet not necessarily
but freely—and Judas, who will suffer damnation
—
under the same condition—shall come into existence,
or that the possible concept shall become actual.
(L p. 414)
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Again Leibniz is saying that there is contingency because God could
have chosen to realize complete concepts different from the ones
which in fact he chose to realize. Thus while the concept of Peter
does contain the property of sinning, as well as all the other prop-
erties that Peter has, God might have realized a different concept in
place of the concept of Peter. Here Leibniz is unclear about the
relationship between the concept of Peter and these other "possible
concepts" (i.e., concepts that could have been realized), but in
his discussion of Adam quoted earlier
,
6
Leibniz says it is one of simi-
larity. He tells us that God chose Adam from among possible persons
who are very similar" to Adam. But the most it seems we can conclude
from these passages is that the existence of Adam, Peter, and Judas
is contingent, and not that the proposition that Peter will sin is
contingent. Yet Leibniz wants to say that the proposition that Peter
will sin is contingent as indicated when he says, "Peter, who will
sin certainly indeed, yet not necessarily but freely." Even if Peter's
existence is contingent, how is it that Peter's sinning is contingent,
since the property of sinning is included in the concept of Peter? The
answer to this question seems to be contained in what Leibniz says
at the end of the Theodicy
,
his major work on freedom.
After discussing various objections to freedom and contingency
for Cod and individuals, Leibniz decides to present a dialogue. He
says about it:
I thought it would be opportune to quote it in
abstract, retaining the dialogue form, and then
to continue from where it ends, keeping up the
fiction it initiated; and that less with the pur-
pose of enlivening the subject, than in order to
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explain myself towards the end of my dissertation
as clearly as I can, and in a way most likely tobe generally understood.
^ ^
Leibniz continues with the story, which deals with the fate
in the following way:
365)
of Sextus,
Jupiter who loves you (she said to him) has com-
mended you to me to be instructed. You see herethe palace of the fates, where I keep watch and
ward. Here are representations not only of that
which happens but also of all that which is pos-
sible. Jupiter, having surveyed them before thebeginning of the existing world, classified the
possibilities into worlds, and chose the best of
all ... I have only to speak, and we shall see
a whole world that my father might have produced
. . one may know also what would happen if any
particular possibility should attain unto existence
• •
.
you can picture to yourself an ordered suc-
cession of worlds, which shall contain each and
every one the case that is in question, and shall
vary its circumstances and its consequences. But
if you put a case that differs from the actual
world only in one single definite thing and in its
results, a certain one of those determinate worlds
will answer you. These worlds are all here, that
is, in ideas. I will show you some, wherein shall
be found, not absolutely the same Sextus as you
have seen (that is not possible, he carries with
him always that which he shall be) but several
Sextuses resembling him, possessing all that you
know already of the true Sextus, but not all that
is already in him imperceptibly, nor in consequence
all that shall yet happen to him. You will find
in one world a very happy and noble Sextus, in
another a Sextus content with a mediocre state,
a Sextus, indeed, of every kind and endless diver-
sity of forms. (t pp. 370-371)
Leibniz here suggests that it is possible that Sextus have a property
he lacks, such as being noble, because there is another Sextus in
another possible world which has the property of being noble. Leibniz
points out that these various Sextuses in different possible worlds
are not identical to the real Sextus but resemble him closely, just
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as he pointed out that God chose Ada* fro* a*ong possible persons
very similar to him but distinct fro* hi*. Considering what Leibniz
says here about Sextus and what he says elsewhere about Ada* and Peter,
the view he seems to present is that Adam does not have blond hair
necessarily because among an infinity of complete concepts which closely
resemble the concept of Adam there is one which lacks the property of
blond hair and which could have been realized in place of the concept
of Adam. In the case of Sextus, Leibniz says, "You will find in one
world a very happy and noble Sextus, in another a Sextus content with
a mediocre state, a Sextus, indeed, of every kind and endless diversity
of forms," (T p. 371). We can expect to find in one world an Adam with
blond hair, and in another world an Adam without blond hair. Since
these various Adams are not identical with Adam, yet are very similar
to him, it seems that Leibniz believes that they are counterparts
of Adam. As pointed out earlier, 7 the counterpart relation for Leibniz
is one which holds between concepts and not individuals, as there are
only individuals in the real world. Thus we can say that a true propo-
-*- s contingent just in case there is one counterpart of the
concept of the subject which contains the concept of the predicate
and one that does not.
The advantage of this view for Leibniz is great. Leibniz can hold
that there is a complete concept of Adam which contains all the prop-
erties that Adam possesses. Moreover, an atomic sentence about Adam
will be true just in case the concept of Adam contains the concept of
the predicate, and hence true propositions expressed by atomic sentences
about Adam are analytic. Yet even though all such propositions are
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analytic, they are not all necessary. Thus, Leibniz can allow for
contingency even though all true propositions expressed by atomic
sentences are analytic. Leibniz never explicitly states that a sentence
is possible because one concept has a property that a counterpart of
it lacks. But given what he does say, this view seems strongly suggested
If we accept this view for Leibniz, there remains a puzzle as
hat Leibniz is doing when it appears he analyzes necessity and
contingency not in terms of counterparts and possible worlds, but in
terms of infinite and finite analysis. If we are to give a complete
picture of Leibniz we must be able to give some account of infinite
and finite analysis as they relate to necessity. Both Rescher and
Parkinson claim that Leibniz introduces these notions, in part, to
explain how analytic propositions can be contingent, and Leibniz some-
times speaks as if he is doing this . 8 But if he can allow for contin-
gency through the use of counterparts and possible worlds, there seems
little point in introducing further complexity in the notion of an
infinite analysis. The key to the solution of the puzzle is that the
problem for Leibniz, given his definition of truth, is really two-fold.
xf every true proposition is analytic, then not only does it
seem to follow that every true proposition is necessary, it also seems
to follow that every true proposition is knowable a_ priori . A propo-
sition expressed by a sentence is knowable a priori just in case the
truth of the proposition can be known by understanding the meanings
of the terms in the sentence (i.e., the concepts associated with the
terms) and the logical structure of the sentence. Consider the sentence,
"Every man is an animal". We can know the truth of the proposition
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expressed by this sentence by knowing what 'man' means and knowing
what 'animal' means, and by understanding the logical structure of
the sentence. In this case the logical structure of the sentence is
the form, "Every is We understand this structure when
we recognize the form and know the truth conditions for sentences of
that form. We know that included in the concept of man is the concept
of animal, and that the proposition expressed by the sentence asserts
this. Thus we know a priori that every man is an animal. On Leibniz's
view, everx true proposition is such that the concept of the predicate
is included in the concept of the subject. But if Leibniz is correct,
then it seems that every true proposition is knowable a priori
, since
m order to know the truth of a proposition we need only know the con-
cepts involved in the proposition. Consider the proposition expressed
by the sentence, "Adam has blond hair." On an intuitive level this
proposition does not seem to be knowable a priori . It would seem that
we would need to know more than just the meanings of the terms in
the sentence and the structure of the sentence in order to know the
truth of the proposition. Perhaps we might see Adam and note the color
of his hair, or we might obtain some authoritative documents indicating
that he has blond hair. In any case it would appear that we need some
additional evidence in order to know that Adam has blond hair. But
on Leibniz s view it seems we know that Adam has blond hair just by
understanding the meanings of the terms in the sentence, "Adam has
blond hair", since the concept of Adam includes the concept of blond
hair. Leibniz's response to this problem is that while all true propo-
sitions are in principle knowable a_ priori
,
we (i.e.
,
human beings)
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will never know all true propositions a priori because „e lack certain
powers
.
Leibniz says he holds two primary truths— the principle of contra-
diction, and: "The principle that nothing is without reason, or that
every truth has its proof a priori
,
drawn from the meaning of the
terms, although we have not always the power to attain this analysis,"
(OC p. 141). But if every truth is in principle knowable a priori
,
how is it that humans can not know all truths a priori ? The answer
to this question is found in the notion of an infinite analysis. Leibniz
says
:
In contingent truths, however, though the predi-
cate inheres in the subject, we can never demonstrate
this, nor can the propositions ever be reduced
to an equation or an identity, but the analysis
proceeds to infinity, only God being able to see,
not the end of analysis indeed, since there is no
end, but the nexus of terms or the inclusion of
the predicate in the subject, since he sees every-
thing which is in the series.
. .
For us, however, there remain two ways of know-
J-.Hg contingent truths. The one is experience; the
other, reason. We know by experience when we per-
ceive a thing distinctly enough by our senses; by
reason, however, when we use the general principle
that nothing happens without a reason, or that the
pi edicate always inheres in the subject by virtue
of some reason. (L pp. 407-408; emphasis added)
Leibniz claims that while contingent truths are indeed analytic, we
can not demonstrate their truth, since such a demonstration or analysis
would have to be an infinite one, hence we can not know them a priori .
God, on the other hand, while unable to complete the analysis (since
it can not be completed) can none the less see that the concept of the
predicate is included in the concept of the subject. We know contingent
truths by experience, though reason does tell us the truth conditions
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for propositions in general.
It seems that Leibniz introduces the notion of an infinite analysis
to explain why humans can not know all analytic propositions a priori .
In fact, as we would expect, the truths which we can not know a priori
are the contingent truths:
And there is no truth of fact or of individual
things which does not depend upon an infinite series
of reasons, though God alone can see everything
that is in this series. This is the cause, too,
why only God knows the contingent truths a priori
and sees their infallibility otherwise than by
experience. (L p . 406 )
Using the idea of an infinite analysis Leibniz attempts to explain why
we do not know all analytic propositions a_ priori
. The problem with
this explanation is that Leibniz explains one puzzling fact by some-
thing which is even more puzzling, namely an infinite analysis. We
have already considered the Rescher and Parkinson accounts of the
nature of infinite analysis, but Leibniz himself gives some hints
for understanding this notion which seem worth considering at this point.
In explaining the notion of an infinite analysis Leibniz often
makes use of mathematical concepts. He says:
But in proportions the analysis may sometimes be
completed, so that we arrive at a common measure
which is contained in both terms of the proportion
an integral number of times, while sometimes the
analysis can be continued into infinity, as when
comparing a rational number with a surd; for instance,
the side of a square with a diagonal. (L p. 407)
Leibniz wants to make some sort of analogy between the relation between
rational numbers to irrational and the relation between infinite and
finite analysis. Rational numbers can be expressed by a ratio between
two integers, for example 15 can be expressed by 1/2, and .333... by 1/3.
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But irrationals cannot be expressed by a ratio between two integers,
and have a non-repeating decimal expansion, such as tt which is 3.1415
and so on. Thus in some sense irrationals are an infinite series of
integers
,
while rationals are not. Leibniz wants to say that just as
7T takes an infinite analysis (in some sense), so do truths not knowable
a priori. However, while one can make some sense of the notion of
infinite analysis in mathematics, it is difficult to see how that is
to carry over into talk about propositions. An example of a finite
analysis will be helpful in understanding the problem.
Suppose we are given that John is a brother and we want to know
whether John is male. Leibniz tells us that analyses are carried on
by substituting for terms their definitions. We know that "brother"
means male and a sibling". We therefore substitute "male and a sibling"
for brother in our original sentence, and conclude "John is male and
a sibling". From this we can conclude that "John is male", and we have
shown in a finite analysis that from the fact that John is a brother
it follows that John is male. So far it all makes good sense. However,
when we try to apply the same idea to the notion of infinite analysis
we encounter some problems. Of course we cannot give an example of
an infinite analysis, but even the idea of one seems beyond conception.
Consider a contingent truth, (say), "Adam has blond hair." We know
that the concept of the predicate is included in the concept of the
subject (if the sentence is true, and we are supposing it is), but
in order to demonstrate the inclusion, an infinite analysis is required.
It seems obvious that by substituting the definition of "blond hair"
in the original sentence we get nowhere, thus it must be that we should
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substitute the definition of "Adam” in order to start the analysis. By
the definition of "Adam" Leibniz means the complete concept of Adam,
which, as discussed earlier, is to be thought of as a set of properties
Thus, what we are trying to demonstrate is that the property of having
blond hair is a member of the set of properties which constitutes the
complete concept of Adam. For simplicity, let us call the complete
concept of Adam "A", and the property of having blond hair "b". What
we are trying to show is whether b is a member of A. A has an infinite
number of members, so we might say that in order to show that b is
a member of A we would have to list all the members of A, which would
be infinite. Thus, to demonstrate that Adam has blond hair requires
an infinite analysis, in that it would require a list of all of A*s
members, which would be infinite. However, there is a slight problem
in taking this to be what Leibniz means by infinite analysis, and that
is even though it may be true that for any given property we can not
decide if it is a member of A or not, if it is a member it will occur
on the list which is infinite.
If A is a listable set, then one can construct a machine (say)
M such that M will continuously create a list of outputs and for any
x if x is a member of A, then x will be output at some time. The point
is that even if A is an infinite set and thus we could not list all
the members, any particular member of A will occur on the list at
some time. It does not follow from this that for any given property
we can decide whether it is a member or not, since at any given time
if it has not appeared on the list we do not know that it will not
appear on the list. If A is listable then it does not appear that
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it would take infinite analysis to show that b is a member of A. M will
start listing the members of A and since b is a member of A, b will
occur on the list at some time; when b occurs on the list, only a finite
number of members will have occurred before it. It is as if we had a
machine programmed to list all the natural numbers in order: the machine
will never complete the list, yet for any particular number chosen, the
machine will list it in a finite number of outputs. Given this view
of concepts (i.e., that they are listable sets), all contingent truths
expressible by atomic sentences are knowable a. priori .
One might avoid this problem if one takes a different view of
what it would be like to attempt to list the members of A. It was
suggested that it would be like having a machine trying to list all
the positive integers. But, one might suggest it is more like having
a machine list in order all the reals between one and four inclusive.
In this case, the list would amount to a single number, namely one. It
would never be able to list any number after one, since between one
and any number after one there are an infinite number of numbers. This
way of viewing infinite analysis has a number of advantages. We can
explain, in a sense, why it is that we could never demonstrate that b
is a member of A. Doing that would be the same as the machine producing
the first real number after one; obviously it cannot be done. The case
of demonstrating necessary truths would be like the machine producing
one on its list. But it has a major disadvantage in that it is hard
to see how the relation among the members of Adam's complete concept
could be anything like the relation among the reals. That is, it is
hard to see how the complete concept of Adam could have the property
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of "betweenness" as the reals have the property of betweenness. Either
way of viewing infinite analysis has its problems.
For our purposes it is not really necessary to solve the problem
of defining an infinite analysis, though it certainly would be helpful
m presenting a complete account of Leibniz. Even though we cannot
present a clear account of infinite analysis, an interpretation of
Leibniz explaining why he introduces both possible worlds and counter-
parts, and finite and infinite analysis, can be suggested. A propo-
sition may be knowable a priori (by us) for Leibniz just in case the
truth of the proposition can be demonstrated by us in a finite analysis.
A proposition is said to be necessary just in case all the counterparts
of the concept of the subject (of a sentence which expresses the propo-
sition) include the concept of the predicate. Using these two notions
we can see how Leibniz might avoid the difficulties suggested earlier.
While it is true that every true proposition is analytic, i.e., the
concept of the predicate is included in the concept of the subject, it
does not follow that they are either all necessary or that we can know
them a_ priori
. Consider the sentence, "Adam has blond hair", and
suppose it is true. If it is true, the concept of blond hair is included
in the concept of Adam. But in order for it to be necessarily true
we must further suppose that all the counterparts of the concept of
Adam also include the concept of blond hair. Such a supposition is
clearly unwarranted. Moreover, in order for us to claim that we can
know a_ prior i that Adam has blond hair, we must suppose that we can
show that the concept of blond hair is included in the concept of Adam
in a finite analysis. Again, this is a supposition which Leibniz would
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claim is unwarranted. Thus, for Leibniz the fact that a proposition
is analytic does not imply either that it is necessary or that we can
know it £ priori .
One of the difficulties in suggesting this account of necessity
and contingency for Leibniz is its apparent lack of precision. Can
we make this account more precise using contemporary logical techniques?
In other words, can we present a semantics for a formal language as
Mates does which avoids the difficulties of Mates' system, has the
same good points as Mates' system, yet at the same time incorporates
in a more precise way the account of necessity and contingency presented
above? In the next chapter a semantics will be presented which meets
all of these conditions.
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In the preceding chapter it was suggested that Leibniz analyzes
truth, necessity and contingency in terms of complete individual con-
cepts, possible worlds, and counterparts. Leibniz, of course, does
not present a complete semantics in the sense that he does not provide
us with a recursive definition of truth for all formulas of a given
formal language. The task at hand is to present a complete semantics
for predicate logic plus the modalities in question, which incorporates
the account suggested for Leibniz in Chapter IV.
In a paper called "Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic",
David Lewis has suggested a different approach to viewing modal logic,
which he calls Counterpart Theory . Given that Leibniz also used the
notion of counterparts, Lewis' paper suggests a good approach to a
Leibnizian semantics. Lewis does not present a semantics in his paper,
but rather provides us with a translation scheme. He presents a way
of translating sentences in quantified modal logic to sentences in
his Counterpart Theory. We understand the sentences in Counterpart
Theory by a number of postulates that Lewis gives as well as by their
English readings. Lewis was not trying to account for Leibniz when
he formulated this theory, and there are certain Leibnizian ideas not
included in Lewis' Counterpart Theory. We now propose to present a
counterpart semantics based to a great extent on Lewis' Counterpart
Theory but including Leibniz's ideas.
First we need some definitions, postulates, and axioms.* A concept
is a set of properties. A complete individual concept (cic) is a set
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of properties sueh that it is possible that there is one object which
has all and only those properties in the set.
Postulates
i) A set K is compossible if and only if K is a non-empty
set of cic's, and it is possible that for any X, if
X e K, then X is realized.
ii) A set K is maximal if and only if for any cic X, if
X ^ K, then kU{x} is not compossible.
iii) A set W is a possible world if and only if W is maximal
and W is compossible.
iv) A cic C reflects a cic D only if it is not possible
that C is realized and D is not realized.
^
v) A cic C mirrors a possible world W if and only if for
any cic D, if D e W, then C reflects D.
vi) A set K involves a cic C if and only if K is a non-empty
set of cic's and it is not possible that for any X, if
X e K then X is realized, and C is not realized.
vii) A set K is closed if and only if K is a non-empty set
of cic's and for any cic C, if K involves C then C is
3
a member of K.
Axioms
I. Every cic is a member of some possible world.
II. For any possible world W and for any cic C, if C is a
member of W then C mirrors W.
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Theorems
Thl : Every possible world is closed.
Proof
Assume: (1)
( 2 )
(3)
( 4 )
(5)
( 6 )
(7)
( 8 )
(9)
( 10 )
(ID
( 12 )
There is a possible world W such that W
is not closed.
There is a cic C, such that W involves
C and C i W.
It is not possible that for all X, if
X e W, then X is realized, and C is not
realized. And C i W.
W is maximal.
W U (C) is not compossible.
It is not possible that for all X, if
X e W, then X is realized and C is
realized.
It is necessary that for all X if X e W
then X is realized only if C is realized.
It is necessary that for all X, if
X e W, then X is realized only if C is
not realized.
It is not possible that for all X, if
X e W, then X is realized.
W is not compossible.
W is compossible.
(10) contradicts (11), thus W is closed.
(Postulate vii)
(Postulate vi)
(Postulate iii)
((3), (4) & Postulate ii)
((5) and Postulate i)
(From (3))
(From (6))
(From (7) and (8))
((9) and Postulate i)
(Postulate iii)
Q. E. D.
103
Th2: Every cic is a member of one possible world.
By Axiom I every cic is a member of some world
show that every cic is a member of only one possible
Assume: (1) There is a cic C such that CeW and CeW^,
and W and W" are possible worlds and W^W'.
(2)
There is a cic D, D e W and D £ W' (or
D ^ W and D c but since the proof is
the same in either case we assume D e W
and D t W^) •
(3) C mirrors W.
(4) C reflects D.
(5) It is not possible C is realized and
D is not realized.
(6) \J' is closed.
(7) does not involve D.
(8) It is possible that for any X, if XeW^,
then X is realized and D is not realized.
(9) It is possible that if C e W", then
C is realized;
(10) and D is not realized.
(11) It is possible that C is realized and
D is not realized.
(12) (11) contradicts (5), hence
(13) does involve D.
(14) D e W".
,
so we will
world.
((1) & Postulate iii)
((1) and Axiom II)
((2), (3) & Postulate v)
((4) and Postulate iv)
(Thl)
(Assume)
((7) & Postulate vi)
(From (8))
(From (10), (1))
(From (7) through (11))
(From (13), (6), Post vii)
(15) (14) contradicts (2). Q. E. D.
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Thus the axioms and postulates imply that a concept is a member of only
one world, which is what we suggested Leibniz holds in Chapter III.
These axioms and postulates give us a rather precise conceptual frame-
work to use in developing a more formal account of the suggestion
presented in the preceding chapter.
The remaining notion to be clarified, and in some ways the most
difficult, is the notion of counterparts. Lewis describes counter-
parts as follows:
Your counterparts resemble you closely in content
and context in important respects. They resemble
you more closely than do the other things in their
worlds. But they are not really you. For each of
them is in his own world, and only you are here in
the actual world. Indeed we might say, speaking
casually, that your counterparts are you in other
worlds, that they and you are the same; but this
sameness is no more a literal identity than the
sameness between you today and you tomorrow. It
would be better to say that your counterparts are
men you would have been
,
had the world been otherwise.
(Lewis pp. 114-115)
In describing counterparts as he does, Lewis views the counterpart
relation to be one among possible objects, rather than a relation
among complete individual concepts. Both Lewis and Leibniz indicate
that counterparts are things which resemble or are very similar to
each other in important respects. However the degree of similarity
needed in order to make two things counterparts, or what the important
respects are in which they must be similar in order to be counter-
parts is never clearly defined by either Lewis or Leibniz.
Leibniz says, "in speaking of several Adams I do not take Adam
for a determined individual but for a certain person conceived sub
ratione generalitatis under the circumstances which appear to us to
105
determine Adam as an individual but which do not actually determine
sufficiently," (OC 129; emphasis added). In talking about several
Sextuses he says, "several Sextuses resembling him, possessing all
that jou know already of the true Sextus, but not all that is already
in him imperceptibly," (T p. 371; emphasis added). These two quotes
from Leibniz suggest that Leibniz thought the counterpart relation
to be somehow a function or a measure of our knowledge of the subject.
In the quote about Sextus, Leibniz indicates that in order for some-
thing to be a counterpart of Sextus it must have at least all the
properties that Sextus is known to have. But Leibniz is very unclear
here, and we should not take him too literally. After all, not all
people would know exactly the same truths about Sextus, and it seems
un^^it to attribute to Leibniz the view that the counterparts of
Sextus would vary depending on who is talking about Sextus and what
he knows about Sextus. For that matter, it seems unfair to attribute
to Leibniz the view that the counterparts of Sextus vary as more is
known (by anyone) about Sextus. We might say that the counterparts
of the concept of Sextus are those concepts which contain at least
all of Sextus' "essential properties".
The problem with this idea is that an essential property is
usually defined as a property that an object has in all possible
worlds. But in a system such as the one being envisioned, an object
exists in only one world, so either the object has no essential prop-
erties or all of its properties are essential, depending on whether
or not one allows it to have properties in worlds in which it does
not exist. In either case this notion of essential properties will
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not be of much help. However, keeping in mind that it appears that
Leibniz wants some connection between knowledge and counterparts, there
may be a way of defining essential properties which will be of some
help in clarifying the notion of counterparts.
We could define essential properties in terms of our a priori
knowledge. That is, we could define essential property as follows:
A property F is essential to a cic X iff humans can know
a_ priori that X includes F.
Thus, for example, the property of being human is essential to the
concept of Adam just in case we can know a. priori that the concept
of Adam includes the property of being human (i.e., we can know a
priori that Adam is human)
. The problem in defining "essential property"
this way is that, as noted in Chapter IV, the account suggested for
Leibniz of priori knowledge is itself less than crystal clear. It
was suggested that one can know a_ priori a proposition just in case
the truth of the proposition can be demonstrated in a finite analysis.
But exactly what a finite or infinite analysis is was left in murky
waters which we will not now attempt to cross. For all the lack of
clarity in the above definition of essential properties, it will help
us to define the counterpart relation.
DF1: The concept A is a counterpart of the concept B if and only
if A contains all the properties which are essential to B.
The most we can get from these definitions of "essential property"
and "counterpart" is an intuitive idea of what the counterpart relation
is, not a precise notion of it. Moreover, DFl is not the only plausible
way of defining the counterpart relation given that we have a definition
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of essential property. But before we consider some alternatives to
DF1, we will first put to use what we have done and present a counter-
part semantics for Leibniz. This will make the consequences of alter-
native definitions of counterparts more readily apparent.
The individual constants will be a
,
a
,
a . .
.
,
the individual12 3
variables x^, x^, x^ . • •, the predicate letters will be all of rank
one (except identity) F^ F^, F
3
.
.
., and the normal logical signs
'
,
' v' and 'O'.
We will say a formula <J> is well-formed iff either $ is a predicate
letter followed by a constant, i.e., F^ (aj or a predicate letter fol-
lowed by a variable, i.e., F^(x^) or an identity sign flanked by constants
or variables, i.e., a = a., x = x., or a. = x., or if $ is well-formed,
J 1 J 1 3
then:
(i) is well-formed
(ii) v ijj'1 (where ip is well-formed) is well-formed
(iii) ^ (x) $'* is well-formed
(iv) ^D$'' is well-formed
A sentence is a closed well-formed formula.
An interpretation is an ordered 6-tuple, <D, G, C, V, f, K> where:
(1) D = the set of all cic's ^
(2) C(D) = the set of possible worlds
(3) G = the set of properties
(4) f is a function such that:
(i) f is from the set of constants onto D
(ii) f is from the set of predicates onto G
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(5) K is the counterpart relation such that:
(i) (a) (a e D -> Ka a )
(ii) (a) (6) [kaB -> (EWJ (W e C(D)~ a e W
±
)
(EW.)(H. £ C(D), g £ W )1
1 1 j
(6) V is a valuation function such that for any sentence $,
possible world VL, wffs ip
, x, variable y, predicate R and
constants a, and 8
If $ is Ra, then V($, W ) = T iff f(R) e f(a)
If $ is Ms then V($, W ) = T iff V (^ , W ) ^ T
If $> is ip v x, then V($, W
± )
= T iff either V(\p, W
±
) = T
or V(x, W
±
) = T
If $ is (y)ijj, then V($, VL) = T iff V [i^ (y/a)
,
w] = T
for all a such that f(a) in W^.
If $ is a = 6, then V($, W
±
) = T iff f(a) is f(6)
If \p is such that it contains n distinct constants
a ... a and no others and $ isQf, then
1 n
V($, W.) = T iff
l
(W.)(B ) ... (6 ){K F (a ) f(8 ) ... K f(a ) f(B ) -*11 n ii n n
v|>( a l/3 ... an/B ) W ] = T}
1 n f
A sentence $ is a necessary truth iff Q $ is true in some world.
A sentence $ is analytic iff $ is true in all possible worlds.^
In the system presented there are possible worlds which are
made up of complete individual concepts. Due to the way possible
worlds are defined, no particular cic is in more than one world. In
agreement with Leibniz and Mates, truth is defined intensionally,
that is, a sentence is true provided that the concept of the predicate
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(vi)
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is included in the concept of the subject. If we symbolize the sentence
"Adam is the first man,” as Fa, then Fa will be true relative to a
given world, provided that the concept associated with the predicate
F (i.e., f (F)
)
is a member of the concept associated with the constant
a. (i.e., f(a)). In this case, presumably, f(F) is a member of f(a).
An atomic sentence, (say) Fa, will be necessary just in case all
the counterparts of the concept of a contain the concept of F. An
atomic sentence is contingent provided that it is not necessary, yet
it is possible. The necessity of sentences, other than atomic ones,
is slightly more complicated, unless there are no constants in the
sentence. Any sentence which does not contain a constant will be
necessary just in case the sentence is true in all worlds, and it
will be contingent provided it is true in one world, but not all.
For example, consider the sentence (x)Fx. This sentence will be neces-
sary provided it is true of all worlds. In order for (x)Fx to be
true of any world, all the complete individual concepts of that world
must contain the concept of F. If (x)Fx is necessary, then every
complete individual concept contains the concept of F. A complex
sentence, (say) Fa^ v Fa^, •will be necessary just in case in every
world either the counterparts of the concept of a or the counterparts
of the concept of a^ contain the concept of F. Thus, as I suggested
for Leibniz, the necessity of a sentence depends upon what properties
the counterparts of the concept of the subject contain (at least in
those cases where the concept of the subject is a complete individual
concept)
.
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In the semantics presented, we have a way to distinguish between
analytic and necessary propositions. Not all analytic propositions
are necessary. Consider the sentence, "Adam has blond hair," and sup
pose that it is true. We can symbolize the sentence as Ba. Ba is
analytic because in every world f(B) is a member of f(a), even though
f(a) is only a member of one world. It is not necessary because
presumably, f(B) will not be a member of all the counterparts of
An alternative to (6)(vi) is:
(J) If is such that it contains n distinct constants a
and no others and $ is O ip, then
1
f (a) .
. . a
n
V($, W ) = T iff (W.)(B ) ... (B ){(f(B ) e W ....f(S ) e W1
J 1 n 1 j n j
K f (a ) f(3 ) ... JKf(a ) f(3 )) -* vJjKV^ -.-“n/B ), W 1 = T>11 nn i 1 nj- J
One might think that (J) is a more natural account of necessity than
(6) (vi) because (J) requires that the counterparts being considered
be in those worlds where the sentence is being evaluated. For example,
consider the sentence DFa. According to (J), q Fa is true in W just
i
in case in every world where f(a) has some counterpart f(3), FB is
true in that world. When determining the necessity of atomic sentences,
(J) and (6) (vi) will yield the same results. The difference between
(J) and (6)(vi) appears when we consider molecular sentences. Consider
the sentence Fa „ Fb . In order for Fa „ Fb to be necessary according
to (6) (vi) , all of the counterparts of f(a) and all of the counter-
parts of f(b) must contain f(F). But according to (J), Fa ^ Fb will
be necessary just in case those counterparts of f(a) and f(b) which
are members of the same world contain f(F). If none of the counter-
parts of f(a) and f(b) share a world, then Fa „ Fb is necessary. Thus,
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it could turn out on (J) that Fa is not necessary and Fb is not neces-
sary, but Fa a Fb is necessary. This is clearly an unacceptable result
and thus for this reason the system presented contains (6) (vi) rather
than (J).^
In the system presented it is possible that a concept C has two
counterparts in some world and it is possible that C be the counter-
part of two concepts in a world. This is also true of Lewis' Counter-
part Theory
,
and led Mates to object to a counterpart semantics for
Leibniz. Mates discusses the idea of counterparts relative to Lewis'
Counterpart Theory
,
and says:
As presented by Lewis, the counterpart relation,
though always reflexive, need not be symmetric
or transitive. Further, it is possible for two
or more different things in a given world to be
counterparts of a single thing in another world,
and it is possible for a single thing in a given
world to be a common counterpart of two or more
things in another world. These features would block
Leibniz from agreeing that 'your counterparts are
men you would have been
,
had the world been other-
wise.' For example, he could not agree that there
are conceivable conditions under which you would
have been Aj and you would have been A? but A^
would not have been A2 • His theory of identity
requires it to be a necessary truth that, given
any two individuals, at most one of them is you.
(M2 p. Ill)
From the above, Mates seems to conclude certain things about the nature
of the counterpart relation for Leibniz. He says, "Let us agree further
with Leibniz that the counterpart relation, whatever other properties
it has, must be symmetric and transitive, and also that nothing is a
counterpart of anything else in its own world," (M2 pp. 112-113). Then,
using what he calls Leibniz's "principle of continuity" he presents
what appears to be his strongest argument against the use of counter-
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parts for Leibniz. He says:
. . . all that is needed for our purposes in the
claim that any two concepts from different worlds
can be joined by a discrete series of intermediate
concepts (from distinct worlds) in which each concept
is enough like its predecessor to qualify as a
counterpart of it. Then, by the symmetry and transi-
tivity of the counterpart relation, we would have
the absurd consequence that every concept in every
world would be a counterpart of every other concept
in any other world. (M2 p. 115)
Mates' argument against counterparts basically rests on three points:
one, an unusual reading of Leibniz's Law of Continuity, which for our
purposes we will accept; two, that the counterpart relation is totally
defined in terms of similarity; and, three, that the counterpart re-
lation is symmetric and transitive. The last two points are intimately
connected in that if either one is lacking the argument will not
work. In the system presented, neither one of them holds.
Mates argues that the counterpart relation must be symmetric and
transitive for Leibniz as well as that nothing can have a counterpart
in its own world besides itself. The reason the counterpart relation
must be restricted in this way is that if it is not, then we get certain
unintuitive results viewed from a Leibnizian perspective. Mates says
that Leibniz would not agree that (say) Adam had two counterparts in
the same world. Mates might be right in saying that Leibniz would not
like something to have two counterparts in the same world, but his remedy
to the problem seems a bit extreme given that he is taking the counter-
part relation to be defined totally in terms of similarity. Mates
suggests we make the counterpart relation transitive and symmetric
and add the following restriction (which is put in terms of the semantics
presented above)
:
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(Cl) (W ) (a) { (w e C (D) - a e W.) + (B)(B e w. - [ Kga -> 6 =.a|)}J J 3 j
While doing what Mates suggests does in fact get us the results Mates
wants, it makes any counterpart system based on similarity unintuitive
from any point of view, whether it be Leibniz's or not. How does one
handle the problem Mates points out if not in terms of transitivity
and symmetry? The answer is simply to add the following two conditions:
(C2) (W.) (W.) (a) (B)(5){ (W. e C(D) -We C(D) A a e Wi J i 3 i A
BeW -6eW.)-> [(KBa - K6a) -*3 = 6’]}
J J
-1
(C 3 ) (W. ) (W ) (a) (8) (6){ (W e C(D) W e C(D) A a e W1 3 i * 3 i
BeW 6eW)-> [(KaB - Ka6) -* 3 = 6]}
Conditions (Cl), (C2), and (C3) together insure that if A is a member
of W. and if A has a counterpart in
,
A has only one counterpart in
W- . They also insure that if A is a member of W and A is a counter-
J i
part to something in W_.
,
then A is the only counterpart (in W_^) to
that thing in W_. And, they insure that if a concept is a member of
any world, then in that world it is its only counterpart. But the
conditions do not imply that the counterpart relation is either tran-
sitive or symmetric. Thus, conditions (Cl), (C2) and (C3) get the
results we want without, it seems, any bad side effects. Moreover, no
matter how one defines counterparts, it seems that principles (Cl),
(C2) and (C3) should hold in a Leibnizian counterpart system. Thus
we shall add them to the original system presented under part (5). As
far as Mates' objection goes, even if we define the counterpart relation
totally in terms of similarity, there is no reason to make the relation
transitive and symmetric for Leibniz, provided we add conditions like
(Cl), (C2) and (C3) to the system. Moreover, even if we did not add
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(Cl), (C 2 ) and (C3) to the system, Mates' objection would not apply
to it.
Mates objection does not hold against the system presented above
because counterparts are not defined totally in terms of similarity.
It will not be true that, "any two concepts from different worlds
can be joined by a discrete series of intermediate concepts (from
worlds) in which each concept is enough like its predecessor
to qualify as a counterpart of it," (M2 p. 115). The reason it is
not true is that if we start with two concepts which do not have the
same essential properties, there could never be a series between them
in which each concept is enough like its predecessor to count as a
counterpart of it. All members of the series would have to have the
same essential properties, yet by hypothesis the first and the last
member do not have the same essential properties. Thus, Mates’ objec-
tion does not hold against the system being proposed. Moreover, it
does not really work against Lewis, since by adding something like (Cl),
(C2), and (C3) Lewis could avoid it.
There is a slight problem in adding (Cl), (C2) and (C3) to the
system presented above. Suppose there is a concept C in a world VL
such that in world W. there are two concepts which contain all the
properties essential to C. According to (C2)
,
C can have at most
one counterpart in world W., yet it appears that on DFl C has two
counterparts in W,. The problem Is, which one of the two concepts
in W which qualify as counterparts under DFl is the counterpart of
j
C? We might change the definition of counterparts to avoid this
difficulty.
115
As mentioned earlier, DF1 is not the only way to define the counter
part relation given a definition of essential property. There are at
least two other ways of defining it which are worth comparing to DF1.
DF2: The concept A is a counterpart of the concept B if and only
if all the properties which are essential to B are essential
to A.
DF3: The concept A is a counterpart of the concept B if and only
if the properties which are essential to A and the properties
which are essential to B are exactly the same properties.
According to DF1
,
the counterpart relation is reflexive, but not
transitive or symmetrical. Under DF2, on the other hand, the relation
is reflexive and transitive, but not symmetrical, while under DF3
the relation is reflexive, transitive and symmetrical. We can easily
incorporate either DF2 or DF3 into the system presented above by
adding the following conditions under part (5)
:
(for DF2) (iii) (a) (3) (6) | (Kag ,, Kg6) -> KaS]
(for DF3) (iv) (a) (8) (Kag -> Kga)
In order to incorporate DF3 we would add both (iii) and (iv)
.
Depending on how one defines the counterpart relation, the results
of the system will vary. For example, Q$ +DO $ is not a result under
DFl, but would be under DF2 or DF3. <>$ is not a result under
DFl or DF2, but would be if we defined counterpart by DF3.
DF3, the strongest of the three definitions, seems to be the most
likely candidate for resolving the problem created by adding (Cl), (C2)
and (C3) to the system. But on DF3 the difficulty is still there. It
is possible that there are two concepts, A and B, in world W^ which
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have the same essential properties that C has in world W.. In fact,
in this case A and B will be counterparts to each other according to
DF3. Intuitively, A in world W is a counterpart of B in world W1 j’
just in case A resembles B more than anything else in W,. But we
do not want the counterpart relation defined totally in terms of
similarity relative to worlds, otherwise it could turn out that the
concept of a particular tree be a counterpart to the concept of Adam.
Perhaps what is needed is a definition of counterpart which combines
the ideas of essentiality and similarity for counterparts.
If A and B are both concepts, then 'P (A)' will be the number
B
of properties that A and B share. Thus, P (A) = P A (B).D A.
DF4: A concept A is a counterpart of a concept B if and only if
(i) A and B have the same essential properties, and
(ii) There is a possible world hh and a possible world
Wj such that A £ H. and B e W_.
,
and (x) [(x^A ~ x e Vh) >
P
B
(A) -*• P
fi
(x) and (x) (x^B . x e W ) -* PA (B) > PA (x)|.
In order to incorporate DF4 into the present system we would add (iv)
(mentioned in connection with DF3 above) under part (5). DF4 allows
only one counterpart per concept per world, which is what is insured
by (Cl), (C2) and (C3). DF4 has a slight disadvantage in that in order
for A to be a counterpart of B, B must be a counterpart of A. In
other words, DF4 makes the counterpart relation symmetrical. This
may seem counterintuitive, given that the counterpart relation is
defined, in part, in terms of similarity. We can avoid this problem
by altering the definition to the following:
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DF5: A concept A is a counterpart of a concept B if and only if
(i) A and B have the same essential properties, and
(ii) There is a possible world and a possible world W
such that A e and B e W
,
and (x)
j
(XM „ x e W
±
) -*
P
b
(A) > P
fi
(x)]
,
and (x)(y){(x^B
„ yM-xeW. - yeW^ ->
[Px(A) > Px(y)] }.
DF5 has an advantage over DF4 in that unlike DF4 it does not imply
that the counterpart relation is symmetrical, but also allows only
one counterpart per concept, per world. (Cl), (C2) and (C3) are all
reasonable, given that counterparts are defined by DF5. We need to
add nothing to the original system (except (Cl), (C2) and (C3)) if
we define counterparts by DF5
,
for the relation so defined is reflexive,
but neither symmetrical nor transitive. It is difficult to decide
which, if any, of the definitions is the most Leibnizian in its treat-
ment of counterparts. Our own choice is DF5, since DF5 incorporates
similarity in the definition, yet does not make the relation symmetrical
or transitive. Perhaps we should view DF2 through DF5 as different
Leibnizian systems, corresponding to the systems S4, S5, B and T of
g
contemporary modal logic, respectively.
In Chapter III, certain things about Mates’ semantics were pointed
out and taken to be objections to his system. It would be well to
note how the. same objections fare against the system being proposed.
As it turns out, not one of the alleged difficulties holds in our
system. One of the problems was the fact that in Mates (Ex)G Fx is
always false. This will not occur in the current system, for if 'F'
stands for a property which is essential to some concept (in this world).
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then (Ex)OFx will be true (in this world). Another problem arose
in connection with the fact that (b) OFa d[(Ex) x=a -> Fa] is a neces-
sary truth. (b), interpreted via Mates, is not something which would
cause Leibniz any discomfort, and so interpreted is true in our semantics
The problem was that (b) appeared to be a translation of a sentence
which Leibniz would not accept, namely, "if it is possible that Adam
has black hair, then necessarily if Adam exists, then Adam has black
hair. In the system presented, (b) does not turn out to be a necessary
truth as a general schema (i.e., it is not a necessary truth for any
constant and any predicate)
. Under DF2 (b) would be a necessary truth
for some a and F if the property of F is essential to the concept of a.
Just as (b) is not a necessary truth, neither is (c) O (a^a) . In
fact, (c) is false in the counterpart semantics, since D (a=a) is true
for any constant a.. But while lJ (a=a) is true for any constant a,
necessary identity is not a result of the system. It might seem strange
to have a system in which a=a is a necessary truth, but if a=b, then
it does not follow that a=b is a necessary truth, but one must remember
how formulas are being interpreted in the system. When we say that a=a
is necessary, we are only saying that all of f(a)’s counterparts are
self-identical, but when we say a=b is necessary (assuming a=b)
,
we
are saying all of f(a)'s counterparts are identical, which is false.
This is because (a=b) is true (in this world) just in case (W^) (a)(8)
if K f(a)f(a) „ K f(B)f(b) then a=8 is true (in W^). The antecedent
of the conditional does not restrict which counterparts of f(a) and
f(b) are to be considered. That is, the counterparts being considered
do not have to be members of the same world, for reasons mentioned
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earlier. Thus even though f(a) is identical to f(b), f(a) need not
be identical to f(B) as they may be members of different worlds. Of
course if f(a) and f (6) are in the same world, then f(a) will be
identical to f(B). However, explaining why the system does not yield
necessary identity is not a justification for its lacking necessary
identity. All things considered it seems necessary identity should
be a part of the system. It can be easily added to the system by
changing (6) (vi) to the following:
(6) (vi) If \p is such that it contains n distinct constants a ... a
and no others, and $ is Oi then
V($^ W_.)=T iff (W
j
) (
$ i
) ••• (3
n
)((K f(3 ) f (a )
K f(B
n
) f
(
a
n
> - (i)(j) L(l^i<A - l<j <n) -> [f(a ) = f(a.) -*
f (3 ) = f(S,)]]} -> V[ip(a!/R)
...
(«n/3 ), W] = T }x 3 1 n 3
The addition of necessary identity to the system is not one which
yields any unintuitive results. If f(a) is identical to f(b), then
surely we would want the counterparts of f(a) to be the same as the
counterparts of f(b). Necessary non-identity is not something we
would want, and does not follow from (6)(vi)". If f(a) is distinct
from f(b), then it seems it should be left open as to whether they
have any of the same counterparts. If f(a) is a member of W. and f(b)
is a member of W. (where W ^ W ) , then it should be possible that
J i j
there is a concept in another world, (say) W such that that concept
K.
is a counterpart of f(a) and f(b).
The system suggested for Leibniz does capture the Leibnizian
account of necessity and contingency presented in Chapter IV. It
avoids the objections Mates raises against using counterparts for
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Leibniz and at the same time avoids the difficulties that Mates' own
system seems to have. Leibniz did not have the use of modern logical
techniques when he presented his views on necessity and contingency,
and often he was writing only in response to claims other philosophers
made, and not trying to present a complete theory. This makes it
difficult to apply modern logical methods to Leibniz; one is never
completely sure that in using such methods he has in fact captured
what Leibniz would have said had these methods been available. Another
difficulty in presenting a system such as the one suggested in this
chapter is that Leibniz, as most great philosophers, occasionally
changed his mind on various philosophical issues throughout his career.
What we have attempted to do in a precise way is to present a solution
to the problem of contingency for Leibniz, which Leibniz suggests
but does not completely work out. The solution we suggest is one
which does allow contingency in a very Leibnizian way, yet keeps
Leibniz's definition of truth intact. When dealing with a philosopher
as great as Leibniz, the most it seems one can do in a project this
size is to consider a problem which is central to his philosophy, but
does not account for all of his philosophy. We hope to have shown
that there is a coherent way of understanding Leibniz which makes
a distinction between analytic and necessary truths in terms of counter-
parts and possible worlds, and hence allows for contingency.
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NOTES FOR CHAPTER V
1* presenting this material I assume that something is possible
just in case its opposite is not contradictory if God created
freely.
2. This postulate suffers from being non-Leibnizian in important
respects. For an attempt at a more Leibnizian treatment of
reflection and mirroring, see the appendix.
3. Postulates vi) and vii) were suggested to me by Robert Sleigh Jr.,
and I am indebted to him for his comments and suggestions on
this material.
4. I assume as Mates does that D, C(D), and G are all denumerably
infinite.
5. I am indebted to Edmund L. Gettier III for many helpful discus-
sions on Counterpart Theory and formal semantics in general, which
in part led to this system.
6. I am indebted to Michael Jubien who pointed out this difficulty
in an earlier version of this chapter.
7. I would like to thank Fred A. Feldman, who pointed out this problem
in a different version of this chapter. Professor Feldman’s
comments and criticisms on all aspects of this dissertation have
been greatly appreciated.
8. T, S4, S5, and B are presented in G.E. Hughes and M.J. Cresswell,
An Introduction to Modal Logic
,
Methuen and Co.
,
Ltd.
,
London, 1968.
9. See pp. 110-111.
APPENDIX
The Leibnizian idea of reflection and mirroring is actually much
stronger than the idea presented on pages 99 - 106, which was sufficient
for deriving the results needed there. The postulate of reflection
presented on page 101 should be a consequence of the stronger Leibnizian
notion. Intuitively, a cic C reflects a cic D if, for any property
contained in D, it can be deduced that it is contained in D from C.
In this appendix we attempt to present a precise account of the Leibnizian
idea of mirroring and reflection using the notions presented on pages
19 and 20 and language ALPC.
$ is a sentence of ALPC if and only if $ is a closed wff of ALPC.
We introduce a new language, ALPC' which is just like ALPC, except
for the following:
$ is a wff of ALPC' iff either (i) $ is a one-place predicate
of ALPC followed by one term, or (ii) if $ is a wff of ALPC',
then (x)$ and (Ex)$> are wffs of ALPC'. $ is a sentence of
ALPC' iff $ is a closed wff of ALPC'.
ALPC' is just a part of ALPC, but a very interesting part for Leibniz.
Let P be the set of all properties, P ... P , and C the set of all
1
n
complete individual concepts, C^ ... C^. f, g, and h are all functions
as defined on pages 19 and 20, where the language being used is ALPC .
Thus the domain of f is the set of all one-place predicates of ALPC.
For any set K of cics, S(K) is the set of sentences of ALPC' associated
with K. That is, if K = {C ... C }, S(K) = h(g(C )) union h(g(C )) ...in 1 2
union h(g(C )). We can now define "compossibility"
,
"mirroring", and
"possible world".
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Definitions
(DF1) A set K of cics is compossible iff S (K) is consistent.
(DF2) A set K of cics is maximal iff for any cic C, C t K then
K^{C)is not compossible.
(DF3) A set W of cics is a possible world iff W is a maximal corn-
possible set of cics.
(DF4) A cic C reflects a cic D iff (Ea)(E£)f(a) = C and f(g) = D
and for any ALPC^ wff $ containing one free variable x, if
x|$]3 e S
(
(D } ), then there is an ALPC" wff (J; containing
one free variable y such that y [$ 3/x „ i|/|a e _V( {C } ) .
(DF5) A cic C mirrors a possible world W iff for any cic D, D e W
then C reflects D.
Axioms
I. For any cic C, there is a possible world W such that C e W.
II. For any cic C, if C e W then C mirrors W.
(DF4) is designed to capture Leibniz's idea of reflection. Every concept
is supposed to "express" all the other concepts in the same world. I
understand Leibniz to be saying that from the concept of (say) Adam,
not only can we deduce all of Adam's properties, but we can deduce all
of Eve's properties, all of Leibniz's properties, and so on for anyone
in the x^orld. If the concept of Adam reflects the concept of Eve and
the concept of Eve contains the property of having brown hair, then on
(DF4) it follows that the concept of Adam contains Eve's having brown
hair. To see this, let f(e) be the concept of Eve, f(a) the concept of
Adam, and f(x[BRx|) the property of having brown hair. The set of
sentences associated with the concept of Eve contains, among other
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things, St [BRx
|
e. Given that the concept of Adam reflects the concept
of Eve, the set of sentences associated with the concept of Adam will
include *[BRe * y] a where f(*[i|»]) is some property that is included
in the concept of Adam. The theorems that can be derived from (DF1)
through (DF5) and Axioms I and II are analogous to those which can
be derived using the definitions, postulates, and axioms presented
on pages 99 through 106. For example, one of the theorems will be
that each cic is a member of only one world. The proof of this theorem
is somewhat complicated but can be shortened by acceptance of a theorem
which upon reflection will seem obviously true. First some helpful
abbreviations: L3 (where 3 is some constant) is the set of all sentences
2 |_$ | 3 e S( { f (3 ) } ), where $ is a wff containing one free variable x.
D a (L3) (where a and 3 are constants) is the set of all sentences
£ [$ ( 3 ) „ iJj] e S ( { f (a) } ) where $(3) is a sentence such that &|$x/s]s e
L3 and \p is a wff containing one free variable x.
Theorem 1: For any set H of sentences of ALPC^ and any constants
a and 3, if H union Da(L3) is consistent, then H union L3 is
consistent.
We leave this theorem unproved, but one can intuitively see why it holds.
That is because, in effect, L3 is a subset of Da(L3). Using this theorem
we can prove that each cic is a member of only one world.
Suppose not; i.e., suppose there is a cic C such that C e W and
C e W' where W and W' are both possible worlds and W ^ W". Since W / W%
there is at least one cic D a member of one, (say) W, and not the other.
C reflects D by Axil and (DF5) . Thus, there is a constant, (say) a,
such that f (a)=C and a constant, (say) b, such that f(b)=D. Since D £ VT
125
and W' is a possible world it follows that W'U {D} is not compossible.
Thus, S(W'U{D}) is inconsistent, and S(W')V S({D}) is inconsistent.
It also follows that S(W') union Lb is inconsistent, since, although
Lb is a subset of S ( (D } ) , for any sentence $ of ALPC' in S ( (D >) there
is a sentence equivalent to <1 in Lb. This can be seen if one considers
that the only sentences in S((D}) but not in Lb are sentences of the
form rFb' where F is a one-place predicate of ALPC. Yet for each
sentence of the form rFb^ in S ( {D }) , a sentence of the form rx[Fx"|b'1
will occur in Lb and the two sentences are equivalent. Since C e W',
Da(Lb) is a subset of S(W^), hence S(W^) union Da(Lb) is consistent.
If S(W") union Da(Lb) is consistent, then S(vO union Lb is consistent,
by Theorem 1. But this contradicts what was said earlier, namely
S(W^) union Lb is inconsistent. Thus, every cic is a member of only
one world.
The notion of reflection presented here is much more powerful
than the one presented on page 101. It also seems more Leibnizian.
However, the view is only a suggestion, and not all the details have
been worked out. The problem of understanding Leibniz's view of
reflection is an interesting one which will certainly have future
consideration in the literature on Leibniz.
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